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Abstract 
 
The following Master’s thesis is an analysis of the terms used in 
both the ethical guidelines and values espoused by companies, 
weighed up against classical philosophical texts and normative ethical 
theories, as well as traditional business ethics. This project is both a 
normative project in that I will be attempting to categorise the ethical 
guidelines and values of companies, and a descriptive project in that I 
will show what these companies are saying and doing right now. What 
particular ethical framework does a company gravitate towards for its 
value system? Are these values consistent with a company’s actions? 
Is business truly ethical, or have the companies merely adopted a code 
of ethics as a safeguard against responsibility, and thereby liability? 
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A Short History of Business Ethics and Terms 
 The concept of ethics in business is as old as the concept of ethics 
itself. Both the Bible and Aristotle, amongst other ancient texts, allocated rules 
and discussed proper behaviour in commerce and trade, just as the  
prohibition against theft was clear-cut in bygone ages. However, it appears 
that once a more secular society became the norm, certain norms’ 
applicability to business were questioned. Amongst others, John Locke 
famously defends the notion of private property as a natural right (the mixing 
of one’s labour with nature), Adam Smith is considered by many to be the 
architect of modern economics (his invisible guiding hand a cliché) and John 
Stuart Mill espoused human utility as the ultimate guide to human thriving and 
happiness. Max Weber suggests that the capitalist system thrives under the 
protestant religion due to the notion that individual salvation in heaven was 
reflected by an individual’s work ethic on Earth, while Karl Marx severely 
criticised this same capitalist system for exploiting labour by not paying the 
true value of human labour (The true value of this labour, according to Marx, 
is reflected in the difference between what is paid to the labourer and the price 
of the product on the market, or in other words, the profit). The notion of ethics 
in business is not new. 
 The emergence of business ethics as its own field is a much more 
recent development, however. As businesses developed from small to middle 
sized to big business in the 1960s, a whole host of new problems and ethical 
issues surfaced such as international business with production in third world 
nations, sweatshops with their associated severely limited rights and 
employee lifestyle constraints, not to mention issues of widespread 
environmental damage. Corporations found themselves under seige for their 
actions, and as a result the notion of social responsibility developed. At this 
stage, each company decided individually what the term meant and how their 
responsibility should be expressed. Companies also actively advertised the 
benefits they were creating for society (and which perhaps was perceived to 
somehow compensate for the company’s externalities and hidden costs). 
 Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) is typically divided into four 
classes:  ’(1) voluntary social action for the employees of the firm in the 
tradition of social policy or corporate social  welfare; (2) environmental action 
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as an expression of the ecological responsibility of the firm; (3) corporate 
citizenship rendering the firm as a legal person into a corporate citizen, 
promoting human rights and political change through civic political action; (4) 
philanthropy as support of philanthropic purposes in culture, the arts, sport, 
science, etc’( Koslowski, 2010, 20). These considerations are not legal duties 
or even ethical duties in a Kantian sense; instead they are regarded simply as 
complementary optional benevolent acts. As such, there is no obligation which 
requires ethical accountability outside of the local legal framework. 
 Business schools expanded upon the CSR concept by creating 
courses for future economists and managers, although little attention appears 
to have been paid to normative ethical systems as such. CSR was an 
empirical exercise which to some extent agreed with notions like that of 
Carroll, which describes the goals of an enterprise in a pyramid type structure 
where profit is the base, followed by legal obligations, and with ideas of an 
ethical nature such as social responsibility (and philanthropy) taking up the 
smallest point at the top. The field proper of Business Ethics came forth in the 
heady 1970s, with the first conference being held in November 1974 at the 
University of Kansas. This was quickly followed by a number of anthologies 
and books on the subject, one of which has been the source of much of the 
information provided in this section: Business Ethics by De George. De 
George also maintains that Rawls’ A Theory of Justice was a critical step for 
philosophers to gain consciousness surrounding such issues. Here business 
ethics attempted to create its own normative systems with a firm basis in 
ethics according to which business practice could and should be evaluated. 
Suddenly there were proposed standards to be followed - both positive to and 
critical of business. For example some, such as Reintorff, suggest that in fact 
all economic activity takes place within the field of ethics, and not the other 
way around. These restraining ideas could be (and were) used as 
justifications for new laws, which would then provide the impetus for business 
to be more aware of their actions in all circumstances and to incentivise (that 
is, to create a demand for) ethical responses to situations and dilemmas. 
Typically this awareness includes a code of ethics such as those that will be 
analysed in the scope of this paper. It also includes clear statements of duty 
and accountability, ethical projects and training schemes, ethics ombudsmen, 
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corporate values and civilizing business practice (that is the creation of 
cultures and mores associated with specific businesses). 
 Such laws tended to follow in the footsteps of big business scandals 
such as the Union Carbide disaster in Bhopal, India (where thousands were 
killed and several hundred thousand injured after a gas leak at a pesticide 
plant which was the result of poor maintenance and failure of safety measures 
). Another example is Enron & WorldCom( financial statement falsifications). 
The chemical industry incorporated a voluntary code of ethics known as 
Responsible Care into their business practices which promoted health, safety, 
environmental performance, improved chemical management, and increased 
transparency. Similarly, the Sullivan Principles existed for businesses 
established in then Apartheid South Africa as a means of justifying their 
businesses in otherwise controversial situations due to the racism of the 
regime (these were later expanded in the so called Global Sullivan Principles 
which endorse human rights, equal opportunity, freedom, compensation, a 
safe and healthy workplace, fair competition, promotion of  community 
involvement and quality of life, and finally the application of the principles to 
those who a corporation does business with). In the United States, the 1991 
U.S. Federal Sentencing Guidelines for Corporations and Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
of 2002 came into being as a result of a series of scandals, and these 
guidelines demanded ethical consideration along the following lines 
respectively: 1) a code of ethics, training schemes, supervising and reporting 
systems ,an enforced feedback system and a corporate ethics officer, 2) that 
the legitimacy and veracity of a corporation’s financial statements be declared 
by the CEO and CFO, as well as a code of ethics for senior financial officers 
and public divulgence. ’The institutionalization of ethical codes and 
compliance officers who are in charge of controlling and enforcing the 
compliance of the legal and ethical rules is used for the prevention of ethical 
failure. Both measures were made obligatory after the Enron scandal through 
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and influenced business ethics rules in all 
international large-scale corporations,’ (Koslowski, 2010, 18). In following 
these requirements and showing that they were ‘bona fide’, a company could 
avoid most of the massive fine set by the United States government in the 
event of an ethical  failure of some sort. The so called Triple Bottom line is 
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another example of a voluntary ethics code in that corporations adopt the 
measure to inform on financial, social and environmental issues associated 
with their business. Similarly, the Global Compact for Companies has ten 
guiding principles in business in the areas of human rights, labour, 
environment and anti-corruption. 
 Today, ’Business ethics and business compliance are instruments of 
risk management…The enterprise must minimize risk arising from the non-
observance of the rules of business ethics and law through the 
implementation and sanctioning of business guidelines which illustrate the 
basic ethical principles of the organization and all organization members. 
Business ethics is part of the risk management of the enterprise against risks 
of reputation loss and penalties,’ (Koslowski, 2010, 18). Having considered 
the risk to the company, what about the risks and prospects of persons who 
have not, and are not, invested in the company. The state and human rights of 
employees, bystanders living in the area, or anyone who experiences 
ramifications due to the company’s actions should be considered. The 
problematic question of arbitration naturally rears its head.  What kind of a role 
does “social contract” play in society? This is where business ethics comes 
into place: “Business ethics, one of stakeholder theory’s major sources, 
stipulates a kind of implicit contract between the firm and society in which the 
firm has obligations towards society, which, in turn, has the right to monitor 
the firm,”(Bonnafus-Boucher, 2010, 56). What happens when business and 
society disagree about obligations, however? The final say appears to go to 
society if we follow a common sense stance, which implies an unequal 
relationship between the parties. However, if we look at instances in which 
such arbitration is practiced, that power situation will be turned on its head, 
and business will get the final say. Which is correct, and which institution 
should realistically be the more powerful is a subject that obviously warrants a 
large amount of discussion, and which will be looked at in the course of this 
paper. This becomes a particularly trying issue when the consideration of 
international corporations comes into place. Who exactly is capable of 
monitoring them? Which society is internationally responsible enough? 
 First, it would behove us all to have a look at the historical notion of a 
social contract. “A social contract that comes from classical political 
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philosoph[y] is based on (1) a tacit, pre-existing sociality rather than a real 
contract; (2) the fact that the social contract is different from a contract 
between two individuals; and (3) an arbitration body governing the parties to 
contract, or an entity that does not have the same status as parties 
(individuals, members, etc),” (Bonnafus-Boucher, 2010, 57). If we take into 
consideration more modern interpretations of the social contract, such as 
stakeholder theory, however, the arbitrator disappears. The fact that 
stakeholders are individuals also suggests (as we commonly see) that they 
will heavily support private interests rather than ‘social good’. Not to mention 
that these private interests in themselves will be altogether reliant upon 
generosity of the business (and its stakeholders). Who are the stakeholders in 
a business then? Traditionally the stakeholders would have been investors, 
employees, suppliers and customers. This traditional view does not take into 
account a number of external ‘stakeholders’ who are also affected by 
business activities. Therefore, stakeholder theory extends the stakeholders of 
business to everything from the public to potential employees and their unions 
(and everything in between). In effect, it extends the stakeholder rights to 
everyone. Obviously, these stakeholders  cannot all be equal in their influence 
over the power relationship between society and business. Therefore, 
stakeholder theory to a certain extent accepts the inequalities of the 
capitalistic system, and supports them in so far as they do not violate the 
primary rights of freedom (the right to life, etc). 
Do, or should, businesses take into account more than their own 
interests? Should profit maximization be the ultimate consideration of a 
business? One would be hard pressed to contend that business practice 
should take precedence over human life. The answer appears to be answered 
in the phrasing of the notion of rights. Rights are supreme. The notion of 
human utilities and happiness must take second place to accorded rights. It 
therefore seems straightforward that business practice must take into account 
certain issues, at the very least issues regarding these rights. How far 
reaching these issues are, on the other hand, and what can really be 
realistically expected of corporations is another question. That human rights 
be considered in the equation seems to be a bare moral minimum. This 
suggests, furthermore, that as a bare minimum the impact of business on all 
9 
 
human societies must be taken into account, and not merely those who will be 
better off as a result of those activities (think of who pays for business 
externalities, and who reaps the advantages of lower cost). A business, like a 
person, must be responsible for their actions and the consequences of these 
actions.  
 What is, though, the ultimate responsibility of a business? And who are 
they accountable to? Are these two notions tied together in any way? That is, 
does who they are accountable to define what their responsibilities are? What 
happens in cases where near society is willing to put up with pollution and 
increased mortality associated with certain industries rather than the certain 
death that might be associated with no industry at all. And yet, other societies 
might not be willing to put up with the increased mortality so long as no other 
immediate threat concerns them. Where does the responsibility of business 
lie? Investors typically favour the simplest answer, and the one which will 
raise the least contradictions in terms of stakeholders, responsibilities and 
accountability. Yet if businesses are accountable only to investors, then 
obviously the ultimate purpose of business is profitability. If business, 
however, is accountable to the entire world, well then we might expect so 
much more of them. If they are accountable to everyone, who is keeping tabs 
on whether they are doing ‘their job’ in being responsible for their actions? 
Who is checking that they are fulfilling the stipulations of their contract? Their 
accountability to investors is easily traceable, malleable, and punishable. This 
suggested accountability to the world, however, does not follow the same 
direct path.  It takes us back to the notion in stakeholder theory that the 
participants in this contract are not equals, and that businesses by definition 
are more powerful than individuals. A national business will be accountable to 
the laws and rules of a country, but the accountability of a global corporation 
is more tenuous. 
 One must be careful in suggesting that people’s freedoms must be a 
core motivator of action, as this argument has been used many times by 
business to justify their own actions: “…the market is justified by calling it an 
expression of human freedom – the classic Friedman (1962) view – this 
creates immediate opposition in many people who daily experience 
otherwise,” (Luetge, 2010, 69). That is to say, here the business suggests that 
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its right to freedom surpasses the right to freedom of other individuals. The 
issue at hand in this argument is not that one person (or corporation) always 
has the right to freedom, as might be an interpretation of the statements 
earlier in the course of this paper, but rather that the freedom of one should 
never come at the expense of the freedom of another. Aggregate freedoms or 
utilities never even enter the discussion. More simply put: It is not part of my 
freedom to take advantage of your freedom. This is not a viable course of 
action (although it is a possible one – just as murdering someone is possible). 
If someone takes advantage of your freedom, there are consequences to this 
action such as your suffering. What is being stated here is that freedom does 
not come without responsibility. Freedom does not come without 
accountability. Freedom does not mean that one is free to act with no 
consequences. Rather freedom means that one incorporates these reactions 
into oneself. Freedom means that one is accountable to oneself as well as 
other people. That one is aware of these restrictions, and that one’s actions 
reflect this. Business must likewise be free in taking responsibilities into its 
own hands properly. 
 I suggest that business has had a slightly immature view of freedom 
and responsibility much like the teenager who desires to be free, but is not 
responsible enough to make the appropriate decisions. This does not imply 
that the teenager (or the business world) is bad, merely that the parent 
(society) will eventually catch up with their child and ground them (impose 
restrictions). After a period of humbling and learning the rules of society, the 
teenager can and should be released to act again. And this is exactly what 
has happened to the business world with their sudden interest in ethical 
guidelines and the discovery of how these might affect their actions. In effect, 
the business world has been rather suddenly confronted with the 
consequences of their actions. The corporations feel the need to ‘safeguard’ 
against future consequences by creating ethical guidelines for their 
corporations. 
 Christoph Luetge in his article on Economics and Ethics: How to 
Combine Ethics and Self-Interest likewise suggests in his idea of order ethics 
that there is a difference between moral actions and rules, and that these 
rules must be enforceable. He further suggests that these rules should have 
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incentives (they should be driven by the carrot rather than by the stick). That 
is, the corporations must see that there are real incentives that go with 
following more moral actions, just as a wayward teenager eventually 
concedes that freedom is not simply acting without consequence. If this is the 
case, that the capitalistic system is ‘maturing’, then one can see the argument 
for not initially making a corporation or business pay for the ‘full extent of the 
damage’ (one can see why the businesses received help in the financial 
crisis) on condition that similar situations do not occur again. The ethical 
guidelines of businesses and corporations should  safeguard against this. But 
are these ethical guidelines accomplishing their duties, or are they simply a 
strategy to ‘get ethical’ and to divert attention away from the consequences 
and who is responsible? This would again be similar to a teenager pretending 
to behave and promising to do as told, and as soon as being out of eyesight of  
the authority doing all the things they want to do either way in the knowledge 
that ‘what you don’t see won’t hurt you’.  Except that of course it does hurt. It 
hurts the teenagers themselves (in that they are not aware of the 
consequences of their actions), it hurts their parents (in that they can no 
longer trust their children to ‘do the right thing’) and society (in that business is 
not maturely following the rules and norms that society sets for very good 
reasons).This accountability both to society and themselves is something that 
will be looked into more closely in the latter parts of this paper when I discuss 
an actual ethical situation. But let it be suggested here that both teenagers 
and corporations apparently need stronger incentives than just pure good 
reason. They need immediate goods along side the long-term desirables. The 
negative side effects of short term (perhaps hedonistic) goods which both 
teenagers and corporations are swayed to follow must be more matter of 
factly apparent, and additional consequences should be in place to ensure 
their displacement. 
 To phrase the problem of business ethics most succinctly, I refer to 
Rendtorff as he stated it: “The problem of the relation between ethics and 
economics in business concerns the concept of economic action and the role 
of ethical responsibility in economics,” (Rendtorff, 2010, 74). He furthermore 
describes, as I have suggested earlier, that business ethics are external 
constraints on this economic action in the sense that ethics is a foundation for 
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any sort of action. However, Rendtorff urges us to be careful in considering 
ethics a kind of “king of economics” (Rendtorff, 2010, 73), thereby pushing us 
in the direction of a dialectical relation rather than a linear relationship 
between economic values and ethical values. That is, Rendtorff increases 
awareness around the issue of dichotomizing these two different sources of 
values, and wants a deeper understanding of how economics and ethics are 
not either mutually exclusive or categorized within one another. Rather, they 
are separate fields of study which can influence and clarify possible future 
actions. 
 As such, ethics is sceptical of a completely individualistic economic 
theory and highlights the benefits of altruism alongside what both the 
individual and a corporation should theoretically consider their responsibility. 
Historically philosophers viewed economics as a part of politics and therefore 
it “was viewed as a moral science, not as a mechanical natural science, but as 
a part of the art of ‘good government’,” (Rendtorff, 2010, 75). Modernity, 
however, took a turn of affairs to focus on the efficient rather than the good 
life. When the focus is on efficiency and profit maximization in economic 
theory, the natural result is in an ambiguous landscape where ethics and 
economics appear mutually exclusive. There is no place in such a micro-level 
self-interested individualistic theory for ideas such as rights or freedoms which 
might be considered the cornerstones of good ethical theories. Rendtorff 
suggests that business ethics could be a missing link of sorts that integrates 
the fields of ethics and economics such that this ambiguity disappears. That 
is, he wants the good life to be influenced by both economic theory and ethics 
as the ultimate point of a dialectical argument. In arguing for this integration of 
the good life into business ethics, Rendtorff feels pressed to ask what 
motivates people. The answer to this question is that there are a plurality of 
values and ethical choices, with no one – say self-interest – being the main, 
much less the indisputably correct, answer.  Moreover, he suggests this 
manifold idea of the good life is closer to the truth in disclosing what 
stimulates activity, including economic activity.  
Traditional ethics is beset with the dispute between self-interest and 
altruism, as well as encompassing the idea of responsibility for future 
consequences of actions. Obviously it is impossible to take into consideration 
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everything that might happen. As Rendtorff puts it the “ analysis of economic 
reason as based on bounded rationality and the ‘garbage can’ conditions of 
decision is not that business decisions are exclusively ethical or economic in 
any ideal sense, but rather that the decision-making is based on a kind of 
‘mixed rationality’ including elements from both economic and ethical 
rationality but certainly also other fields like politics and law( Rendtorff, 2010, 
82).” This suggests that one can never make an ‘ideal decision’ based upon 
‘ideal rationality’ within an ‘ideal framework’, but instead that a lot of 
considerations both rational and otherwise come into play in the daily process 
of judging and executing actions. However, what is certain is that ethics does 
ultimately play the sort of foundational role that Rendtorff alludes to since an 
action must usually be considered minimally amoral (that is, not immoral) to 
even be contemplated as desirable.  Indeed there are such ethical checks on 
individual freedom. 
 In addition to the notion of ethics, it will do us some good to consider 
the term economics as well. Particularly interesting is whether one could 
naturally conceive of ethics being a dimension of economics; that is, whether 
economics is inherently value laden or  an external source of value which 
could be procured through the means of economics, amongst other types of 
action. One point that will shed light upon whether economics has an internal 
or external relationship with ethics (that is whether ethics is a part of 
economics by definition, or whether there are two different fields which could, 
but need not, influence one another) is the issue of property rights . “To 
respect property rights is viewed as the foundation of the economic system 
and part of fair competition is not to question basic property rights, “ 
(Rendtorff, 2010, 90). This statement is not controversial, and the founding 
father of modern economics Adam Smith would certainly have agreed with it. 
If the property rights of a business are not respected, no one would doubt the 
necessity of external intervention. As such, a ‘right’ demands defence if and 
when it appears to be disrespected. It also seems that property rights are not 
value neutral, rather they are value laden as a positive right. It is a right that 
people have for a reason: that being at its most basic level security for future 
existence and future action. It is a leap to suggest from one example that 
business is therefore ethical by nature, but it is suggested that all action has 
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an ethical dimension and that economics is simply one type of action. 
Therefore, “ Business ethics is about right values at the micro-level or 
organizations, but also about individual behaviour in organizations and at the 
macro-level. In this sense, business ethics is about defining acceptable ethical 
positions of the firm within society and in relation to the state,” (Rendtorff, 
2010, 93). Thus,  business ethics is about finding actions which are ethically 
acceptable at a minimal level, and hopefully influencing actions which are 
ethically positive- that is, actions that enhance society. Because of this 
foundation of business ethics, the normative question of which values 
business should pursue is not an external interdisciplinary question. It is an 
internal question coming from the heart of business, a business with an 
ethically defined pulse. 
The notion of a necessary tension between economics and ethics, 
although colloquially accepted, appears to be a paradox. Either ethics is a 
dialectically parallel field to economics, as Rendtorff would have us classify 
the process, or economics is a type of action, and therefore by definition due 
ethical considerations such as trying to find the good life or the right action. 
Either way, to suggest that ethics has no place in economics is akin to 
suggesting that ethics has no place in life. In dreaming up the ideal good life 
ethics has a place. To use a business example, surely all would agree with 
the premises set up by a business contract: “The ethical principles of business 
contracts are that (1) contracts and agreements should be based on informed 
consent among partners; (2) moreover, facts that are the basis for the 
agreement should be reliable; (3) no one can be forced to make a contract; 
and (4) the agreement must never bind partners to immoral action,”(Rendtorff, 
2010, 83). There is an inherent element of fairness at play here, as well as a 
notion of ideal business (ideal life). In order for a business contract to be 
ethical, it must be fair to both parties as no one would willingly choose to be 
on what they perceived to be the losing end of the contract. A contract should 
ensure that there is a fair allotment of both advantages and disadvantages- 
which in turn implies a sort of justice for all. Good business is not a profit 
game where all actions (and values) are equal. Some actions take 
precedence, and I suggest ethics is the source in finding the best solutions, 
while justice is the incentivizing agent. 
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Ethics 
In discussing what types of ethical systems business have, a natural 
part of this discussion will be what specifically is meant by the word ethics. To 
define a term in this way is at the very heart of philosophical discussion and 
the Socratic Method. The Webster dictionary offers the following definition of 
ethics:  ”the discipline dealing with what is good and bad and with moral duty 
and obligation” and ”a set of moral principles : a theory or system of moral 
values <the present-day materialistic ethic> <an old-fashioned work ethic> ”, 
not to mention: ”the principles of conduct governing an individual or a group 
<professional ethics> ” and ”a guiding philosophy : a consciousness of moral 
importance” (reference). Finally there is the most general definition:” a set of 
moral issues or aspects (as rightness) <debated the ethics of human 
cloning>”. What is being discussed in the scope of this paper is specifically the 
professional ethic of businesses, or in other words,” the principles of conduct 
governing” the group of individuals in the specific arena of business. 
 An interesting question is whether it is conceivable that a business 
could have a completely individuated ethic at all. Are nurses, for example, 
really expected to perform ethically on a level above and beyond what is 
expected of another person? Or perhaps only to the limits of their knowledge? 
If a nurse is in a situation that requires a certain type of action of which they 
have knowledge (be that experiential or theoretical), and they have been hired 
to do this certain action, then it makes sense that this action would be 
expected of them. It also follows that there would be ethical ramifications if 
this action was not preformed by this nurse. That is, in essence, it would be 
bad if they did not perform this action. However, are they required ethically to 
go beyond this action if they have the knowledge to do so? Could this similarly 
be required of any other person? If placed in extreme circumstances (a car 
crash, etc), it seems a natural reply that they should (and so should any other 
person). Does that mean that on a daily basis, the field of nursing is more 
ethically laden than that of another non-medical field? What defines the ethical 
situation as ethical? What defines the situation of a businessman as less 
ethically laden? The immediate life or death repercussions? 
 In Alan Goldman’s discussion in his book  “The Moral Foundations of 
Professional Ethics”, he identifies the idea of special ethics that are 
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associated with specific jobs as a differentiation of ethics. This differentiation 
implies that the people who do a specific job must have an ethic that is 
different from what is expected from other people, as well as the normal moral 
code. For example, we can imagine that in the situation of a car crash, a 
nurse might have an extra ethical push to help beyond that of a person with 
no medical training. At the same time, however, we would consider it to be a 
good action that a person with no medical training helps, and we would 
consider it bad if this person made no effort in a situation in which they had 
the ability to help. We do not, however, expect this person with no medical 
training to stop by at the local hospital to help on a daily basis, even though 
we might consider this to be a good action in the same way as one might 
conceivably expect this of the nurse (particularly if the hospital were somehow 
in dire circumstances). 
 If a profession follows the normal moral code, and yet has extra 
’duties’, this is identified as weak differentiation. If a professional group is 
exempt of the normal moral code in lieu of a professional code, this is 
considered strong differentiation. If the profession simply must follow the 
moral code, there is no differentiation. In a weakly differentiated profession, 
Goldman maintains that the normal moral code always takes precedence. He 
defends the notion of strongly differentiated ethics, such as what is practiced 
by judges, by pointing out: ”…Some central institutional value will fail to be 
realized without the limitation or augmentation of his authority or responsibility, 
and that the realization of this value is worth the moral price paid for strong 
role differentiation”. In effect, judges must follow the moral code of their 
profession even in circumstances where the individual judge feels this to be 
the wrong action. Here Goldman firmly points to the fact that differentiations of 
ethical roles come at a price. All individualized and professional ethics pay this 
price: the price of blurring the normal moral code. 
 What is meant by the statement that ethics comes at a price? Consider 
a non-ethical world, what does this world look like? The first thing that comes 
to mind is of an egocentrically egotistical world where everyone would take 
whatever they want with no thought for another. Where does this non-ethical 
idea of what the world lead? Perhaps non-ethical rather than meaning 
UNethical as in bad, means not ethical as in a situation that is neither good 
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nor bad. This would be the same differentiation as between immoral and 
amoral. Thus there is a notion of a non-ethical, what shall henceforth be called 
a pre-ethical situation. It is a situation in which ethical considerations are not 
yet applicable. What sort of situation would this be? It might be a ’natural’ 
situation, that is, one of the ’natural’ world. Natural is here used in the sense 
of that state which is untouched by civilization or people. Rocks are pre-
ethical. In their ’natural’ environment, how could rocks be ethical? Even if 
rocks were set to avalanche over a group of people ’in nature’ (here again, a 
situation separate from civilization or people), the situation would not be 
ethical (albeit it would be tragic) unless there was someway in which some 
person could have deliberately placed either people or the rocks in this 
situation. The ethical situation takes place when a person capable of changing 
a situation is present. Likewise, animals are not usually considered ethically 
active, although we can imagine them in ethical situations. Animals, as a part 
of the ’natural’ world, do not have actions which can be considered good or 
bad. A lion is not murdering a zebra (with all of the bad implications of the 
word). This lion is acting ’naturally’. Thus a ’natural’ situation is considered 
pre-ethical. Are there other situations which are also pre-ethical? For example 
a business situation? 
 An ethical situation necessitates people who are capable of  actively 
participating in events on some level (for the purposes of this discussion, the 
such beings will be restricted to people). In a situation like a car crash or an 
avalanche,  one could imagine the situation being simplified to there would be 
a good way of acting and a bad way of acting. That good way of acting might 
come at the price of losing something else, for example to act in the good way 
in the situation of a car crash, might require that coming late to a meeting. Or 
even missing work. Perhaps even losing out on a days income. At what point 
would the price of the action outweigh the good action?  Consider the 
example of the Good Samaritan who stopped to help the fallen 
(robbed/injured) man. The priest and the Levite simply walked by, and are 
historically condemned for their action. But who is to say that the price of 
helping this fallen man was not too high for them? There is no explanation 
given of why they did not stop to help, simply that they did not. However, the 
price of helping was certainly not too high for the Samaritan, and therefore he 
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did help. Likewise a price was paid by this Samaritan in order to help: he had 
to stop his journey, he used his oil and wine on the fallen man, he put the 
fallen man on his donkey, and he had to walk to a destination (perhaps out of 
his own way) where the fallen man could receive further help. 
 Goldman proclaims that the moral price that is paid for strong sense 
differentiation of a profession is that other morals are sacrificed (in the same 
way that the Priest and the Levite sacrificed the fallen man to something) and 
that therefore their perception of the normal moral code has somehow 
become dulled. That is, if these professionals expect their professional code 
to trump the normal moral code in their work because of strong differentiation, 
they will allow it to trump the normal moral code in other circumstances as 
well. Or are we simply to be relativistic and allow for normatively different 
ethical systems which require no justification for their special preference? The 
whole purpose of an ethical system is to provide an ultimate justification for 
certain actions. Otherwise the trap of relativism awaits. The correct action is 
usually the ethical action, and it is the action which is expected to be 
performed: The nurse discussed above is expected to perform her tasks in 
such a way the she has right results. These are the correct actions for her to 
undertake, and they are justified both by her knowledge as well as the 
situation. Ethical reasons are therefore a sort of ultimate and overriding 
reason for action which take precedence over other types of reason. They are, 
furthermore a necessary justification for any people's actions. The idea of 
strong differentiation is therefore all the more interesting, as what we are 
considering is a trump to this ultimate and overriding reason for action. The 
logic for this trump must indeed be very strong, if it exists at all. As Goldman 
comments, ‘Central norms of various professions must take their place in the 
common moral framework that provides such overriding reasons: in situations 
in which these norms determine only hypothetical imperatives, in which they 
are normally overridden by other more stringent duties, they cannot be 
elevated to ultimate prominence. It is a truism that professionals, like 
everyone else, ought to do what is morally required of them in all 
circumstances,’ (Goldman, 1980, 9). 
 Goldman is inspired by Kant, and we will take a dutiful tour of the 
implications of this ‘common moral framework’ later in this paper, alongside 
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four other ‘common moral frameworks’. But let it just be mentioned here that 
for Goldman, and Kant, an individual right (such as the right to life) not only 
always overrides individual utilities ( like the enjoyment of an ice cold drink) 
but also always overrides collective utilities (such as the enjoyment of a drink 
in general by many persons). Goldman would suggest that a collective utility 
(such as the million collective joys of having an ice cold drink) could never 
override an individual right (a life). Therefore a collective utility could never 
trump an ethical reason founded on a right, and any utilitarian ethic would be 
doomed to falls short for failing to take this into account. The notion that 
business ethics are predominately utilitarian should therefore be viewed with a 
bit of skepticism at the very least.  
 In effect, what Goldman is asking, is “ Why should being a professional 
count as a moral difference?” (Goldman, 1980, 21). Why would being a 
professional exempt one from the normal moral framework? Why, to use the 
example of the Good Samaritian, should the Priest be exempt from helping 
the fallen man? What type of reason would be strong enough to trump the 
right to life of the fallen man? To put this question in the business world, does 
a professional business ethic override the ethical systems set up by society?  
 Ethics is the promotion of eudimonia – or thriving- of the human race. 
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Business Ethics 
 
 “ A shift of emphasis must take place from the embodiment of 
sovereign will through persons and electoral acts and specific organizations, 
towards procedural requirements to processes of communication and 
decision-making,” (Buhmann, 2010, 189).  
 
 So now the question becomes: is the market actually an ethical 
engine? Is ethics external to economics or necessarily internal to it? Is 
economics about maximizing profit, about efficiency, or is it a prudent use of 
resources? How different are economic restraints functioning within the 
market? Could such constraints be perceived in a positive light (as in 
deontological constraints), or are any constraints automatically negative in 
view of the ideal of the free market? In discussing the notion of constraint, 
values immediately come to mind because some action is being constrained 
as a result of values that are present in either a hard or soft form in the 
situation. Hard values are concrete, tenable objects that are pursued for their 
own end and do not require an ought as they are self-promoting and do not 
need outside reinforcement: money, power, law. Soft values reflect more 
ambiguous, intangible ideas that do require an ought as they are morally 
universal requirements: welfare, the environment, social benefits, human 
rights, etc. Rights can, furthermore, be either positive (what you have a right 
to do) or negative (what others do not have the right to do to you). Hard 
values are incentives in themselves (that is, all other things being equal, profit 
is good), while soft values need backing up. Hard values tend towards reason, 
soft values towards passion. That is, we are passionate about soft values, 
while hard values incentivize themselves. However, “…it is not self-evident 
that organizations fulfil soft values, even if they are considered beneficial for 
individuals or for society as a whole,” (Thyssen, 2010, 162). Soft values seem 
to reflect non-objective notions, while hard values are more objective in 
nature. “It makes more sense to die for lofty ideals than for a well ordered 
budget,” (Thyssen, 2010, 163). 
 There is a growing leaning towards adopting ethical and company 
values, and this seems to be a step towards behaving ethically in economic 
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spheres. Therefore today companies openly express their company’s ethical 
and company values, and yet “if values are inherent in any decision, talking 
about ‘value based management’ seems superfluous, as management is only 
possible based on values,” (Thyssen, 2010, 162). Companies have always 
had values, otherwise they would have had nothing to base any decisions 
upon. There have always been reasons for why one path of action was 
chosen and not another, but values are not always concretely stated for the 
public eye. More developed values do reflect an increased response to 
particular situations, that is the company would be more likely to be sensitive 
to and pick up on circumstances identified with a particular value. Moreover, 
this increased sensitivity could help a company to solve any confusion due to 
rivalling values. For instance, between the values of efficiency and profitability 
it seems clear that profitability would be higher order for a business, even 
perhaps in some cases where there was good reason for more efficiency such 
as a hospital setting. “The solution of a value conflict makes the organization 
visible and becomes part of its identity,” (Thyssen, 2010, 164). There are a 
number of different ways of solving value conflicts dependent upon how the 
organization has ranked or considered the values present. If the values are 
considered to be of an equivalent worth, then the solution becomes 
compromise. If one value is considered to be of greater worth, such as in the 
example of profitability and efficiency, then the lower value will simply be 
suspended in the event of a conflict. In this case, the company may well be 
aware that this value is ranked lower than another, and the lower value may 
merely be a strategic play by the company. However, there it may also be that 
the company has set a lower limit below which neither value can fall. In this 
case, both values are fulfilled to the extent that they reflect the limit.  
 Sometimes a company sees no way of fulfilling a stated value, they 
might then consider it a vision for the future, and actively participate in 
developing that value. In this situation, the company might work to downplay 
the differential between the actual situation and what the value dictates about 
the situation. To have a vision of perfectly healthy employees is not realistic, 
however a company can claim that it has the goal of increasing health and 
work to eliminate situations which detract from that value. This is not a value 
which can ever be completed in the sense of compromising or solving a 
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conflict, but it is a value which can be a constantly reaffirmed and considered 
in company conversations.  “If political values are considered both mandatory 
and impossible, they may form part of the self-description of an organization, 
not in order to be fulfilled, but in order to legitimate that they are not fulfilled,” 
(Thyssen, 2010, 166). An organization intends to fulfill them in the future, 
therefore it will be tolerated that it is not completely accomplished now. The 
words of the company compensate for actions, while the full commitment to 
the value is transferred to an open future. Furthermore, opaque words are 
helpful in creating opaque situations, so as to reduce comparability between 
the reality of the situation and the normative value stated. “Therefore, the 
quality of the organizational values cannot, in the spirit of Protestantism, be 
decided by testing the goodwill of the decision-maker, but must, in the spirit of 
Catholicism, be measured by the good deeds and their consistency over 
time,” (Thyssen, 2010, 165). Consistency here would constitute something 
similar to notion of reproducibility that is so important to the sciences. Thus, 
theory is never enough, there must always be a testable element of practice 
present in an ethical situation. When a hard value comes into contention, 
there is usually an objective source which can help in the judgement process. 
The law reflects this in terms of managerial practices, earnings, and taxation, 
etc. However, when such objective directives are absent then the company 
will be ultimately responsible for the decision made and the value held. So 
long as the source of the decision is objective, the company remains 
anonymous, but when a value-laden subjective decision is made the company 
will be marked as the decision maker. This implies, for example, that when a 
company is present in circumstances which have less objective constraints, 
they are all the more responsible for their actions. Economics influences and 
sharpens ethical arguments, however ethics is the ultimate foundation of 
economic (and all) action. 
 CSR (Corporate Social Responsibility) seems to have been a first step 
towards incorporating ethics into the world of business and economics. It is a 
common belief that CSR must be voluntary, or it will merely be anonymous 
actions that show no responsibility. “Regulation and standardization are 
possible, but not wanted, because they are looking backward, not forward and 
do not strengthen the image of an organization,” (Thyssen, 2010, 168). 
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Responsibility is exactly how companies are attempting to portray their actions 
as ethical choices, which in turn reflect the company identity. And so, although 
this social responsibility is not optional, it is up to the provider of the service to 
specify details. It is a calculated model obligation which is neither guaranteed 
nor abiding, bound by a specific time and circumstance. Some would clearly 
view this as aiming at the wrong ends, and therefore be unethical. 
Furthermore, since CSR is a voluntary soft value there is no compulsory 
incentive nor any other constraint upon action. “Is it asking too much to expect 
business to go beyond its conventional economic roles to become a more 
active, conscious and accountable participant in the process of international 
development?” (Blowfield, 2010, 197). What would the consequences for 
business and the world be to have business as a development agent? Does 
the concept of business acting ethically require positive acts, or is avoiding 
negative acts enough? That is, must the business positively help people and 
society, or would simply ’not doing wrong’ be enough? Would simply 
abstaining from wrong-doing put business into a ‘non-ethical’ category rather 
than an unethical category? Is a business responsible for or constrained by 
situations which lead to, avoid and relieve social plights? There are certainly 
times when businesses do go beyond their economic role such as when 
poverty influences business decisions: “(a) when business is a cause of 
poverty; (b) when it is poverty’s victim; and ( c) when it identifies poverty as a 
commercial opportunity,” (Blowfield, 2010, 198). The first refers to how the 
marketplace can disenable people depending upon their situations (i.e. 
Women, ethnic groups, etc). The second refers to the potential available if 
everyone had similar status, freedom and wealth - a place without a vast 
percentage of the world’s populace living under poverty conditions.  The third 
suggests that  business does have opportunities that both are profitable and 
favourable to the destitute. Taking such circumstances into account, it is 
obviously the case that business is operating in situations that are ethically 
tinged. When businesses take actions in the world and they are necessarily 
placed in ethical situations. How they approach their actions, however, is 
another matter. 
 Many businesses, and schools, approach the field of ethics as a 
science. Could it also be understood as a hermeneutical conversation?  
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McCloskey works with Friedman’s description of a science in considering the 
placement of economics in the spectrum. Friedman has ten points which he 
considers necessarily present in any field that presents as a science: 1) 
Circumstances should be predictable as well as controllable by the science; 2) 
Observations and predictions are equivalent to truth; 3) Observations must be 
objective and reproducible - humans are thus eliminated as they have a 
tendency to lie; 4) A hypothesis is false only when proven so by 
experimentation; 5) There is no link between subjective and objective 
phenomena; 6) Numbers reflect the truth in an objective and reproducible 
fashion; 7) The justifying data are true regardless of current theories; 8) There 
is a clear methodology present; 9)Theories are universal and equivalent to a 
law; and finally 10) No oughts, no valuations, just numbers. McCloskey then 
asks whether economics is a posteriori (a statement requiring experimental 
justifications) or a priori (a statement that is true in itself).He points out that it 
is a normative field with value statements (profit is desirable!) and is therefore 
not a science, but rather a  hermeneutic investigation of the marketplace, 
businesses and the values associated with these. There is no a priori 
justification for economics: “Ethics is about the values and values-driven 
management is about the ethical norms that should govern corporate 
decision-making,” (Rendtorff, 2010, 257). McCloskey then suggests that a 
hermeneutical conversation implies a pluralistic approach in ethics, and that a 
number of different objects should be taken into account when considering 
business ethics: corporations; in-house interactions; the ethics of 
administrative actions; associations and communications with varying nations, 
communities, environments and organizations. Business ethics should be 
considered from a micro-level analyses within one business, to the macro-
level notions of the function economics plays in the world at large and the 
international marketplace. 
 In short, economics likes to view itself as a definite science based upon 
empirical evidence of monetary profit and resource efficiency. However, 
scientific models are idealised paradigms rather than an accurate reflection of 
reality as such. Although, these paradigms do give relevant, useful and 
important predictions (even on imperceptible affairs) this does not mean that 
they are truistic of nature. In fact, even science with its apriori approach that is 
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based upon an analysis of numbers, is based upon certain values (such as 
the previously mentioned value of reproducibility)! And economics is nothing if 
not based upon communications between humans, and the corresponding 
actions.“ Economics is not separated from society and the issues of 
economics in society is a problem of the social legitimacy of economics, “ ( 
Rendtorff, 2010, 270). Heidegger tells us that our understanding of reality is 
an institutionalized social construction. At the very least, economics then is a 
human interpretation of certain human actions, and as such it reflects a 
multiplicity of values. It should be a field that is aware that it is a symbolic 
reflection of a certain perspective rather than a set of universal rules in a 
value-free scientific enterprise. Economics should be aware of its own 
frontiers and gray areas, and as a human construction welcome the 
qualification of its actions through ethical justifications. Business ethics 
should, in other words, be a set of critical conditions for action, and require 
responsible behaviour from the business world in all circumstances ( and not 
just in situations that are obvious ethical dilemmas). “Economics should not be 
restricted to end-mean rationality, but goals of economics should be 
determined in the light of the practice of social interaction,” (Rendtorff, 2010, 
270). What business ethicists like Rendtorff are saying, in effect, is that the 
actions and strategies of a business are not logical a priori scientific 
derivations, but the result of a certain business culture with its affiliated values 
and norms. These economic values and norms are also reflective of society in 
general, and cannot accurately be considered separate from society. Without 
society at its base, there would be no structure known as business nor any 
field known as economics. 
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Ethical Frameworks  
 The following is a discussion of five selected paradigms of ethics within 
philosophy. These are: Utilitarianism, Virtue Ethics, Deontology, Care Ethics 
and Pragmatics. Business ethics in itself, as well as the history of Business 
Ethics, has already been preliminarily discussed. As a starting point for 
investigations into individual company ethics proper, I will endeavour to find 
five words or phrases that could be used as ‘summary’ words for each of 
these fields. That is, in the course of the discussion of the various paradigms 
of ethics, phrases or words that are unique to and which describe an ethical 
paradigm will be selected. These summary words (phrases) will be discussed 
in the context of their particular type of ethics, as well as why these particular 
phrases have been chosen as a marker for an ethical paradigm. I will then 
present these summary words for each paradigm within the context of the 
real-world ethics and values of Statoil, and try to argue accordingly for a 
particular ethical position for the given company’s ethical word usage.  
Once the company has been thus systematised, I will furthermore look at real-
life ethical situations that the company has been exposed to, and see if they 
have followed their own ethical guidelines and/or the ethics prescribed by the 
ethical paradigm within which their guidelines fell. 
 At the outset I would like to point out that the data collection present in 
the Addendum section of this paper, and which forms the basis of my 
analyses and graphs, is qualitative in nature. However, an attempt has been 
made to quantify the data in terms of word analysis, thus creating an early 
methodology to attempt to draw meaningful conclusions.  
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 Utilitarianism: 
 Utilitarianism is a consequential ethic which was most famously 
promoted and refined by John Stuart Mill, although Jeremy Bentham is 
considered its true father. Basically consequentialism holds that the moral 
worth of an action is determined by its outcome. Jeremy Bentham formulated 
Utilitarianism as a type of consequentiality that followed the greatest 
happiness principle, which is to say that the action that had as its result the 
greatest happiness was also the best and most useful action. Thus good is 
here defined as utility to people, and utility is that property which tends to 
bring happiness to people (or which tends to  prevent unhappiness). Bentham 
wrote ,” A measure of government…may be said to be confirmable to or 
dictated by the principle of utility when in like manner the tendency which it 
has to augment the happiness of the community is greater than any which it 
has to diminish it,” (Bentham,1990, 11). However, we may ask, how do we 
know if one happiness (or unhappiness) is greater than another? If two things 
bring happiness, how are we to chose? If two people each chose a different 
source of happiness, are they equal or is one better? 
 Here Mill attempts to come to the rescue, “Utilitarian doctrine is, that 
happiness is desirable” (Mill, 1990a, 15), and “Questions about ends are,…, 
questions [about] what things are desirable” (Mill, 1990a, 15). What Mill is 
stating here is that utility is defined by happiness which is defined by 
desirability.  That is, what is desired points the way to what will make one 
happy and what makes one happy shows what is useful. Happiness is the 
ultimate good which we all desire, and is therefore the main criteria of a 
utilitarian ethic. So the answer to the above question of which source of 
happiness might be best could be: it is the source of happiness which brings 
the greatest happiness. Yet, “The ingredients of happiness are very various, 
and each of them is desirable in itself, and not merely when considered as 
swelling an aggregate. The principle of utility does not mean that any given 
pleasure, as music, for instance,  or any given exemption from pain, as for 
example health, is to be looked upon as means to a collective something 
termed happiness, and to be desired on that account,” (Mill, 1990a, 16). Mill 
suggests here that not any happiness will do. Some happiness is more 
worthwhile than other happiness (in effect, the long time goal of health is 
28 
 
preferable to the short time goal of eating cake today). Or as Mill so eloquently 
put it: “It is better to be a human being dissatisfied than a pig satisfied; better 
to be Socrates dissatisfied than a fool satisfied. And if the fool, or the pig, are 
of a different opinion, it is because they only know their own side of the 
question. The other party to the comparison knows both sides,” (Mill, 1990a, 
63). That is, if two people are of a differing opinion regarding what brings 
happiness and one knows both sides of the story (one has eaten cake each 
day and then become healthier by not eating cake each day, while the other 
has only eaten cake each day), then the side with inside knowledge of both 
sides should know best. Because I know how to read, and I remember what it 
was like to not know how to read, I know that it is best -for everyone- that 
people learn how to read. Although I can see the unhappy struggle my 
children go through in learning how to read, I know that in the end there is 
more happiness in reading well than in being illiterate. But are we really willing 
to go so far as to say that I am happier than my children because I know how 
to read? Am I happier than a tribesman in the Amazon because of my ability 
to read? Mill might have responded positively that I am, however it appears to 
be more complicated and situation dependent. That is, any people in my 
particular situation would be happier knowing how to read (and therefore I 
have a certain knowledge regarding my children since their situation in all 
likelihood is not all that different from my own), however the tribesman from 
the Amazon is probably happier knowing how to read the forest than a book.  
 Mill’s point was not so much to illustrate that one person’s desires are 
superior to that of another, rather that often those goods which we have to 
strive for such as reading, health, absence of pain or vice, virtue… 
(Shakespeare and NOT the Simpsons), seem to give greater happiness. 
Furthermore, anyone who would be so bold as to suggest that this is not the 
case, simply does not have the full story, has not worked hard enough to 
achieve that particular good and has chosen the easy way out, condemning 
themselves to a life of less happiness. “The comparison of the Epicurean life 
to that of beasts is felt as degrading, precisely because a beast’s pleasures do 
not satisfy a human being’s conception of happiness,” (Mill, 1990, 62). Or in 
other words, just because something does bring happiness to one does not 
imply that we have aimed correctly. 
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 This is a defining issue of Utilitarianism, namely how do we produce a 
practical moral judgment? How do we decide what we should be aiming at? If 
Bentham’s happiness is not enough to guide us to action, what is? Do we 
need to be omniscient in order to perform a good action? Where does that 
leave the real moral agent who is trying to decide between two courses of 
action (eat cake vs not eat cake). This is an agent who can never be ideally 
informed. Can two people have different outcomes (learn to read a book, learn 
to read the forest) even if their situations are similar (should I -or the tribes 
parent- teach one of our children to read a book so they can prosper in a 
cosmopolitan life, and the other how to read the forest so they can prosper 
“naturally“ ?). Nozick offers an answer when he considers the mind game of 
the experience machine to which a mind is linked such that it gives extreme 
happiness. “What is most destroying is their living our lives for us,” (Nozick, 
1990, 60). Happiness is not enough, if we are not somehow the sources of our 
own happiness. And the more we strive for something, and master something 
(like reading, or Shakespeare), the more we are the result of our own actions 
and our own happiness. Thus, what appears to make Mill’s virtues a greater 
utility and source of happiness than simple desires (what makes being healthy 
better than eating a piece of cake) is our ability to have control over our own 
happiness and utility. In being healthy, I am not indebted to the cake for a 
moment of pleasure and happiness. I give it to myself. Or in Nozick‘s words, 
“Perhaps what we desire is to live (an active verb) ourselves, in contact with 
reality”, (Nozick, 1990, 59). In being healthy, I have a longer connection with 
reality than I do in eating a piece of cake. Being healthy is not limited to as 
short a piece of time as eating a piece of cake is, and therefore appears to 
offer greater happiness and utility. 
 This brings us straight into another big problem with Utilitarianism, 
namely the happiness vs. desire argument. The account mentioned above 
which points out that experience of reality is a necessary element of utility 
negates the happiness version of Utilitarianism. Pure happiness, if achieved 
through an experience machine, is not desirable. A person would not willingly 
choose this machine over ’real life’ except perhaps in very extreme 
circumstances. And even then, people appear to prefer to fight for an 
improvement in their real ’extreme’ lives, rather than to give up and 
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experience the fake good life. Therefore it seems that an account of 
Utilitarianism that considers desires as markers of utility is closer to the mark. 
However, as stated before, these can not just be any desires. Some desires 
appear to be more valuable than others, and therefore only informed objective 
desires appear to count for anything. Eating cake every day is not an informed 
desire, whilst being healthy is (and everything that might entail including not 
eating cake every day). Fulfilment of these so called informed desires is thus 
equal to utility. However, Amaya Sen  proposes that Utility is actually a type of 
vector with distinct parts, amongst which desire is one. Pleasure is another. 
None of these vectors are homogenous, yet this lands us right back into the 
problem of which desires should be pursued in terms of utility. And what in 
fact happens when our awareness of desire fulfilment is not in keeping with 
reality? That is, what happens when we think a desire has been fulfilled (aka 
higher utility for us) when it has in fact not been fulfilled. These are 
complicated anomalies in Utilitarian theory which lack good answers. Rawls 
suggests that what these complications highlight is that, “Utilitarianism does 
not take seriously the distinction between persons,” (Rawls, 1990, 85). Rawls 
further suggests that perhaps what is necessary to soften the blow of these 
problems is a modified theory of rights (rights will be discussed more 
thoroughly in the Kantian section). He thus states that, “…no distribution of 
satisfaction is better than another except that the more equal distribution is to 
be preferred to break ties,” (Rawls, 1990, 91). And likewise Ronald Dworkin 
points out that Utilitarianism really is to the benefit of the majority in that: “In 
any community in which prejudice against a particular minority is strong, then 
the personal preferences upon which  a utilitarian argument must fix will be 
saturated with that prejudice; it follows that in such a community no utilitarian 
argument purporting to justify a disadvantage in that minority can be fair, “ 
(Dworkin, 1990, 106). There appears again to be no basis for preferring one 
desire, and its resultant happiness, to another as this is merely a reflection of 
cultural bias. 
 Yet another Utilitarian problem is the so called utility monster: namely 
Parfit wrote that the hedonistic principle, according to which only quantity 
matters, which the above logic suggests we must adhere to, sadly implies that 
the more people who exist the better, so long as their lives are just barely 
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worth living. This is in contrast to the average principle where only quality 
matters and as such fewer people who are happier overall would be better. To 
put in individual terms, it is the problem of the century of ecstasy versus the 
drab eternity: “Two futures: live for 100 years of pure ecstasy, or forever in a 
life always barely worth living,” (Parfit, 1990, 147). That is, a lot of a little 
happiness appears to be better according to Utilitarian thought than a little of a 
lot of happiness. A world full of cake eaters is apparently better than the few 
healthy dozen. Yet is this the choice made by people by and large? Do 
people, if given the choice, have a lot of children who barely survive, or do 
they only have a few to whom they grant “everything”. Historically, many 
children were the rule, and yet when truly given a choice populations seem to 
revert to fewer healthier children. 
 In contrast to some other ethical paradigms, in Utilitarianism no act is 
strictly forbidden. That is, when there are no values which suggest certain 
desires and actions are inherently better than others,  it makes for an empty 
ethics: “…when the mere existence of an individual person by itself has no 
value apart from the by-products and uses of the individual in producing and 
enjoying desirable states of mind, there is no theoretical barrier against social 
surgery of all kinds,” (Hampshire, 1990, 160). Few could be lead to support 
this kind of logic in the light of history and Nazism in Germany. Some acts 
apparently must be forbidden. Herein comes another big conflict for 
Utilitarianism between those who are act oriented and those who are agent 
oriented: Utilitarianism seems initially to be agent oriented in focusing on 
individual happiness and desires. Furthermore, this agent orientedness 
suggests that all people be treated as ends, that all people are equal in their 
desires, rather than that they be seen as a means to some greater good of 
happiness for all (which could allow for the so called social surgery). Act 
oriented Utilitarianism, on the other hand, focuses solely on the 
consequences, and therefore allows people to be used as a means to greater 
ends. Where should the focus of Utilitarianism lie, in the desire of the 
individual or the happiness of the masses? 
 As was stated earlier, some acts, at least, must be prohibited in order 
to avoid ends at too great a cost. Sometimes the actions which might lead 
ultimately to good consequences do matter. As a result, once more 
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utilitarianism splits itself into Act versus Rule Utilitarianism. While act 
utilitarianism here allows for certain rules of thumb which could be followed, 
but whose appropriateness really should be considered in every application, 
rule utilitarianism conveys strict rules (along the lines of do not kill) which are 
to be followed by all. Act utilitarianism has application problems, much like the 
desirability issue, in terms of the knowledge of the agent (which can never be 
ideal), and yet rule utilitarianism seems to collapse into act utilitarianism when 
pressed to find an objective reason for particular rules (for example, in cases 
where not acting in accordance with the rule has greater benefits than acting 
in accordance with the rule suggests: eating cake at a birthday party to show 
celebratory spirit and group adherence rather than sticking to the strict rule of 
not eating cake for health reasons).  Hare suggests there are two levels in 
ethical thinking as a solution to this particular problem. The first level would be 
good general principles which should not be breakable and therefore do not fit 
into a rule of thumb category. However, in cases where these rules for some 
reason do not fit ( for example, when two principles are in conflict or when 
principles simply do not apply) thinking and evaluation must take place in a 
leisurely manner at a second higher level. The second level is the act 
utilitarian level with “the object being to have those level-1 principles whose 
general acceptance will lead to actions in accord with the best level-2 
principles in most situations that are actually encountered,” (Hare, 1990, 231). 
That is, level-1 is a rather anti-utilitarian rule utilitarianism which tells people 
exactly how to act in all situations encountered. Meanwhile, level-2 is act 
utilitarianism through and through such that each rule in level-1 is evaluated 
slowly, deliberately and thoroughly such that the best possible unbiased 
principles are a basis for level-1 everyday morality. However, now the 
questions turn to the desirability basis of these principles, as well as whether 
morally right and morally rational really are synonyms. Level-1 everyday 
principles may turn out not to be the morally right action although morally 
rational, while the good action may turn out to be the action that is not right, 
and the actions of the good person may therefore be rationally wrong. “To 
inform a traveller respecting the place of his ultimate destination, is not to 
forbid the use of landmarks and direction-posts on the way. The proposition 
that happiness is the end and aim of morality, does not mean that no road 
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ought to be laid down to that goal, or that persons going thither should not be 
advised to take one direction rather than another,” (Mill,1990b 224-225). 
Through this quote it appears that Mill himself neither believed in a totalitarian 
type indiscriminate following of the rules, nor in a completely open anarchistic 
act utilitarian lifestyle. Rather his utilitarian ethics were more akin to a type of 
virtue ethics, in which the virtues could be predetermined in a level-2 rule 
utilitarian type manner. Not to the extent that he thought these virtues (or even 
morality and ethics as such) are actually objective goods, but to the extent 
that they tend to increase happiness and utility.  
 The discussion of utilitarianism was put forth in an effort to discover 
which core words might be useful in finding whether businesses adhere to 
utilitarian ethics. The following words will be used as a source for comparison: 
Utility - in that actions should be evaluated in terms of their propensity to 
promote the desirable; happiness - in that happiness is the ultimate end of all 
things desirable; revisionist - in that rules can be altered to bring about a 
better result; secular - in that people determine their own values and desires 
in setting their goals; and real- in that the theories should take into account 
real outcomes. 
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Virtue Ethics 
 
 The next section in the search for five descriptive words, is Aristotelian 
virtue ethics. Aristotle, of course, was of the opinion that intelligence and 
deductive logic resulting in technical actions neither was enough for a true 
practical reason, nor virtue as such. Practical reason could not be simply a 
deductive type of epistemology as the truths from which ethical actions are 
concluded are unqualified and unchallenged starting points (something is 
simply given), while the technical procedures which result in ethical actions 
are actually contingent upon the results of earlier actions. For Aristotle the act 
of seeing - and having the character which took the time to look for the 
important qualities of a situation - was almost more important than the act of 
doing: “…knowing how to discern the particulars, Aristotle stresses, is a mark 
of virtue,” (Sherman 4). A person who has a virtuous character according to 
Aristotle, is able to identify the ethically prominent features of a situation. 
However, even having this mark of virtue (discernment)  is not sufficient, 
although it is certainly necessary, if there is no action (doing), for Aristotle 
says further, “…it is impossible to be good in the full sense of the word without 
practical wisdom or to be man of practical wisdom without moral excellence or 
virtue,” (Aristotle, 1997, NEVI1144b31-32). This suggests that we are all 
somehow dependent upon external factors such as whether we are born into 
a good family, or not, which in turn will influence the schools we are put into 
and thus ultimately our ability to perceive and gather the necessary 
knowledge. The ability to set up a pratical goal is very similar to the setting up 
of an Aristotelian end. That is to say, there are practical steps one takes to be 
healthy is similar to there being practical steps one takes to be good (step 1: 
no more cake…). These are actions one takes, not merely a state of being 
good (or healthy). 
 The reason procedures and rules are not enough, but a virtuous 
character is necessitated, is that in order to be good a person must be 
physically present in the circumstances and must recognize that these 
circumstances require action. This person must be able to justify their action, 
and not just haphazardly point at given rules. If an agent does not notice the 
morally salient features, then that agent lacks virtue (likewise the agent is 
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lacking in virtue if they notice particular features that require action, but do 
nothing). “The continuous thread in Aristotle’s response to both rigorous rules 
from the top down and legislative procedures from the bottom up is that they 
side-step the issue of how we confront the particular case,” (Sherman, 1989, 
28). It is a requirement of virtue that the agent’s vision is extended and 
enlarged in such a manner that it is open to enquiry with a reflective grasp of 
ends. There are different manners in which a situation can be read, and 
various questions allow a situation to be seen with more clarity and insight. 
Dialogue with others is required such that the virtuous agent has the 
appropriate training necessary to also be good at listening and identifying 
other viewpoints. “ A life in dialogue with others will have its effect on how we 
interpret and read the circumstances of ethical action,” (Sherman 30). The 
ability to see ethical considerations requires participation and training- i.e. 
ethical education. Appropriate perception requires an ethical sensitivity-and 
with it the use of learned ethical concepts. 
 When an situation is encountered which has irresolvable differences, 
there will be a requirement that some meaningful values must be relinquished. 
A person is responsible for these chosen values, and should have enough 
education to recognize the values as well as the flexibility of character in 
recognizing when they are appropriately espoused (or not). A particularly 
good example of Aristotle making this point is the notion of the mean: “I am 
referring to moral virtue: for it is moral virtue that is concerned with emotions 
and actions, and it is in emotions and actions that excess, deficiency, and the 
median are found. Thus we can experience fear, confidence, desire, anger, 
pity, and generally any kind of pleasure and pain either too much or too little, 
and in either case not properly. But to experience all this at the right time, 
toward the right objects, toward the right people, for the right reason, and in 
the right manner - that is the median and the best course, the course that is 
the mark of virtue,” (Aristotle, 1997, NEII1106b15-23). Ethical standards are 
contingent upon the situation at hand, and as thus cannot be universally 
followed in the manner of a mathematical rule. Circumstances do not come 
pre-labelled, and so ethical education or “this process of ‘seeing as’ is a 
necessary prerequisite for action,” (Sherman, 1989, 40). Furthermore, this 
median of virtue is not simply an intellectual cognition of concepts, as we can 
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see from the above Aristotle’s quote: it is also the correct sort of emotional 
reaction to a situation. What is being discussed here is the appropriate sort of 
fear, confidence, desire, anger, pity, and pain or pleasure of any kind. What is 
being discussed is the type of circumstances these feelings would be 
appropriate in, and Aristotle spends a lot of time defining emotions that are not 
properly virtuous. In fact, “Virtues are defined as states by which we stand 
well or badly with regard to feelings,” (Sherman 49). This aimed at mean 
which is  virtuous is thus the ability to act appropriately and with the proper 
sort of emotional sensitivity to a particular situation. 
 This brings us once again back to the notion of dialogue, and the 
intense necessity for dialogue when a person is virtuous in an Aristotelian 
way. As stated before, there are a number of factors that virtue depends upon 
such as education, but virtue is also dependent upon less obvious factors 
such as good family, and leisure. If one should be so unlucky as to be born 
into dire circumstances, such as with bad parents, it does not make virtue an 
impossibility, it simply means that one must first take the steps to acquire what 
is simply given to someone of better birth (better family, etc). This because the 
Aristotelian notion of virtue is a universal one. A person cannot be virtuous in 
just one field; if a person has one virtue, that person by definition must have 
them all. And unfortunately for people born into the wrong circumstances, 
Aristotle was also of the firm opinion that virtue was an absolute necessity for 
happiness. But happily virtue is also never a solitary condition, but rather one 
that should be lived cooperatively. “To have practical wisdom, Aristotle writes 
in NEVI.8, is to be interested in one’s own welfare as part of the common 
welfare,” (Sherman, 1989, 53). This is  the reason why Political Science was 
considered to be a field of high honor by Aristotle. By not creating common 
welfare, one would in effect be condemning those in less prosperous 
circumstances both to a life of immorality and unhappiness, and by extension 
confirming one’s own immorality as one by default due to that lack in virtue. 
Good living is by its very Aristotelian nature cooperative. Who met the criteria 
of personhood in Aristotle’s Athens is another matter however. For example, 
both women and slaves are permanently defective, while boys are merely 
immature. 
 Ethical perception, for Aristotle, was a type of acknowledgement of the 
37 
 
salient features in a situation or choice made before any action was taken. 
However, these thoughts are not enough to move an agent to action. It is fully 
possible to imagine someone who understands what is ethical, but does not 
act appropriately. This may either be because these people are weak willed 
(or what Aristotle calls akratic, they know what is best, and intend what is 
best, but do not follow it), or because they are vicious (they know what is best, 
but it does not move them to action). Along with reason, one must have the 
desire for the correct act. “…Aristotle’s account of desire suggests that it is 
because something seems good to us that we desire it, and not that it is good 
because we desire it. If we can change how things appear to us, then we are 
in a position to begun to reform our desires,” (Sherman, 1989, 63-64). Our 
desires lead us to ‘intend’ to act in certain ways, and these intentions in turn 
become realized if they are possible. Rationality is therefore the ability to have 
consistent intentions (that is I do not both intend to eat the cake and not eat 
the cake, although I may desire to do both on some level). And virtuous 
people are those who manage to create intentions that are appropriate to a 
certain situation thus hitting upon the mean when they act. These people are 
reliable in both their knowledge and perception of the situation, but 
furthermore have the appropriate resources for handling the situation. “It 
[reasoning] is not so much deciding from the beginning that something 
matters to us, like peace or health or alleviating suffering, but deciding, 
through successive encounters with the world, in what way it matters, at what 
cost, when and towards whom. It is these questions that an agent answers 
when she acts; and these questions that give content to end,” (Sherman, 
1989, 87). 
 So, as was stated before, the important question seems to become: 
what ends should be maximized? In what order should ends be maximized? 
And the answer appears to be equivalent to what is good for a human being, 
that which is essential and constant. And the ultimate end, the ultimate target 
for a human being so to speak, is happiness, which in its turn “consists in the 
activity of virtue,”(Aristotle, 1997, NEVI1144a6). In fact, Aristotle goes on to 
say: “virtue makes us aim at the right target, and practical wisdom makes us 
use the right means,” (Aristotle, 1997, NEVI1144a8). Thus we understand that 
human beings can attain happiness through virtuous activity, but this 
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happiness transforms both the goals and the process of human lives. There is 
a dialectical process between a person’s reasoned choices and their desires, 
which is constantly being transformed by the goal, as well as the goal by both 
the desires and the choices. This means that neither goals nor desires nor the 
choices that lead from one to the other are static, but that that these can all 
can be transformed, built upon and cultivated. “We must not follow those who 
advise us to have human thoughts, since we are [only] men, and mortal 
thoughts, as mortals should; on the contrary, we should try to become 
immortal as far as that is possible and do our utmost to live in accordance with 
what is the highest in us. For though this is a small portion [of our nature], it 
far surpasses everything else in power and value…A life guided by 
intelligence,” (Aristotle,1997,  NEX1177a 31-35;1178a6). Intelligent rational 
thought must guide us, though it does not describe people in their entirety only 
that which is perhaps ‘most’ and ‘especially’ human. Therefore, even if an 
action does not give the desired result, this does not define that action as bad 
or as failed. Because this value lies both in the means of an act as well as its 
end (while a vicious action is worthless without a certain end). Aristotelian 
virtue is not empty of content (the means, the process, of an action matter) in 
the same way as Utilitarianism in acquiring goods. 
 However, since rationality does not explain the whole human being, 
what is this thing that rationality controls, which furthermore provides the 
content of action? It is of course character! While this character is non-
rational, it is entirely capable of following reason - much as a child does a 
parent, suggests Sherman. It is this character which is defined as virtuous, it 
is the mode of conduct and emotions. Neither character nor rational thought, 
however, are enough alone: “it is impossible to be good in the full sense of the 
word without practical wisdom or to be a man of practical wisdom without 
moral excellence or virtue,” (Aristotle,1997, NEVI1144b31-33). The rational 
and intelligent part of humans must be present to perceive and discern the 
finer features of a situation, while the emotions are virtuous and thus pick up 
on what is good in a situation. Human rational thought, Aristotle says, helps 
humans perceive what they SHOULD perceive and feel. “Virtuous activity falls 
short if, in the end, it disregards the passions, if behaviour fails to evidence 
the proper feelings and sentiments in addition to the proper action and 
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beliefs,“ (Sherman, 1989, 174). Emotions bring virtue to life in a living 
breathing way. Virtue is passionately lived and its truth is felt through human 
sentiment (perhaps most characteristically happiness), but it needs the eyes 
of reason to perceive a situation. 
 A discussion of character explains the mean virtue of Aristotle - a 
character traits\ that is in the middle of two vices on the slippery slope of 
action. At one extreme of this slope, there is a vice marked by excess while at 
the other extreme is a vice marked by deficiency. The mean is the golden way 
between these two vices. Take the notion of bravery: “For example, a brave 
man seems reckless in relation to a coward, but in relation to a reckless man 
he seems cowardly,” (Aristotle, 1997, NEII 1108a19-20). Aristotle carries on to 
note that the opposite of a coward is not a brave person, but a reckless 
person. The brave person is neither a coward nor reckless, but in control of 
what the situation demands. Other examples of virtues with their vices of 
excess and deficiency, respectively are: self-control as the mean of self-
indulgence and insensitivity (as regards pleasure and pain); generosity as the 
mean of extravagance and stinginess (as regards spending money on the 
small and personal); magnificence as the mean for gaudiness and 
niggardliness (as regards spending money on the large and societal); high-
mindedness as the mean for vanity and small-mindedness (as regards honour 
and dishonour in the small and personal); there is an unnamed mean for 
ambition and being unambitious (as regards honour and dishonour in the 
large and societal sphere); gentleness as the mean for being short-tempered 
and apathetic (as regards anger); truthfulness as the mean for boastfulness 
and self-deprecation (as regards pretense); wittiness as the mean for 
buffoonery and boorishness (as regards pleasantness in amusement); and 
finally friendliness as the mean for a flatterer and grouchiness (as regards 
pleasantness in daily life). Furthermore he mentions a number of emotional 
states which can be considered similar to virtues as these also have similar 
means, for example: modesty as the mean for shamless and shame (as 
regards the sense of shame); righteous indignation as a mean for envy and 
spite (as regards the prospering of others), (Aristotle, 1997, NEII1107b1- 
1108b10). Aristotle also discusses two notions of justice in book five of his 
Nichomachean Ethics in the light of his virtues, and these are defined as 
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fairness and lawfulness. That is, something is just (or fair), for example, when 
properties are equally distributed; and something is just (lawful) when, for 
example, someone has been reprimanded for wrong doing. “For though all 
that is unfair is against the law, yet it does not follow that all violation of lawful 
is unfair,” (Aristotle, 1872, NEV,p12). 
 Similar to our discussion of utilitarianism, this discussion of the virtues 
in Aristotle’s Nichomachean Ethics was put forth in an effort to discover which 
core words might be useful in finding whether businesses adhere to a virtue 
type ethic. I herewith offer the following words as the best sources of 
comparison value: Ethical (or moral) - in that there are correct or higher 
standards (character traits) which should be followed in a manner akin to 
virtues (actions are not empty of content); particular-  in that each situation is 
considered in its singularity, and not as a result of rules for all; discussion- in 
that controversial circumstances and ideas can be contended; educational: in 
that ethical issues, ideas and practices can be learned; rational and 
emotional- in that people will take that approach which expresses the inherent 
humanity of a case; and justice- in that circumstances should be fair to all and 
lawful. 
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Deontological Ethics 
 
 Ethics is often viewed as a set of rules which should be followed by all, 
ethical guidelines in business tend to be exactly that - a set of rules for all (in a 
certain position?) to follow. This notion of a set of rules which ought to be 
followed comes from the normative domain known as deontological ethics, 
and primarily from Kant. The moral worth of an action is based upon whether 
it follows a universalized rule which can be applied to all persons in all 
circumstances. An example of this would be that “normally, the excuse, ‘I was 
just doing my job,’ is not acceptable” (Goldman,1980, 3). Doing one’s job is 
not a universally applicable rule that can be a priori accepted in the manner of 
a moral justification. In this case, there must be a better backing for action 
than what is required of a job, and the moral framework of deontological ethics 
demands that the universal set of rules be followed without exception by 
everyone. The requirements of a job do not excuse a negative action nor the 
negative consequences of that action. This universal set of rules follows 
rationally from what is known as Kant’s Categorical Imperative which is an 
absolute requirement for all rational beings (not to be confused with his 
hypothetical imperative which is only required once certain conditions - in the 
guise of ends and goals that we will and aim at- have been satisfied). There 
are four common formulations of Kant’s Categorical Imperative and these are 
expressed by the following maxims or willingness to do something and the 
corresponding action: 1) the universality formula: “I should never act except in 
such a way that I can also will that my maxim should become a universal law,” 
(Kant, 1993, 399-400), 2) the humanity formula: “Act in such a way that you 
treat humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of another, 
always at the same time as an end and never simply as a means,” (Kant 429), 
3) the autonomy formula: “the third practical principle of the will as the 
supreme condition of the will‘s conformity with universal practical reason, viz., 
the idea of the will of every rational being as a will that legislates universal 
law,”(Kant, 1993, 431) and finally 4)the formula of the kingdom of ends: “Act in 
accordance with the maxims of a member legislating universal laws for a 
merely possible kingdom of ends,”(Kant,1993, 439). All other moral laws are 
derived from these, and Kant would suggest that any given situation could be 
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better analyzed through one or all of these formulations. 
  The universality formula is in some ways a play on the golden rule of 
do unto others as you would have them do unto you. But Kant rejects this 
comparison saying that the later is merely a simplistic derivation of his maxim 
as it completely neglects to mention or incorporate the very important concept 
of duty. People, or any rational beings, are universally constrained by the 
Moral Law, and as such they are ‘duty’ bound to the moral law in much the 
same way as one might be duty bound to support a good friend, or to be a 
good citizen. It is true that there are people that do not act as a good friend, 
good citizen or good person should and Kant mentions this apparent anomaly 
in Grounding for a Metaphysics of Morals. That there are people, Kant would 
say, that do not understand the duty of the Moral Law, nor feel the constraint 
of it does not tell us anything about rationality nor that law. “Consequently, 
reason unrelentingly commands actions of which the world has perhaps 
hitherto never provided an example and whose feasibility might well be 
doubted by one who bases everything upon experience; for instance, even 
though there might never yet have been a sincere friend, still pure sincerity in 
friendship is nonetheless required of every man, because this duty, prior to all 
experience, is contained as duty in general in the idea of a reason that 
determines the will by means of a priori grounds,”(Kant,1993, 408). That is, 
despite plenty of evidence of friends acting contrary to this ideal of a good 
friend, the ideal remains an analytic apriori definition of true friendship. In this 
case, it might be because these individuals are not properly acquainted with 
the universal law, or the ideal of friendship, and do not understand the 
application of that law and the inherent duties of a friendship (in the same 
manner as some might misunderstand scientific universal laws, and their 
application). That is, a law which is objectively necessary, a law which is 
unrelentingly commanded by reason, is practically subjectively contingent, it is 
a law that is personally chosen by the person who wills actions. The person 
who knows of the friendship ideal must still constantly choose actions in 
accordance with the ideal of friendship. This apparent lack of experiential data 
(what we experience other humans doing) does not reflect upon the veracity 
of a theorem. The scientist who understands a scientific law would not 
contend that it was unjustified because a great many more people 
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misunderstood the law than understood it. In this sense, the practical 
applications of a law or action do not reflect the truth of that law or action. 
Kant’s universal law is necessarily a priori as it is ultimately justified by logic 
and there is no further background justification for it. That is, it is an apriori 
synthetic in that the law is not is based upon outside experience, but it is also 
not true by definition as it does not explain itself analytically in the manner that 
for example “a mother is a female parent” does. Here the concept of female 
parent is held within the concept of mother, and to deny the second part (the 
predicate) of the utterance would be a contradiction (the non-female parent is 
not the mother - by definition). On the other hand in synthetic cases such as 
“Not all mothers have given birth” the sentence is not self-descriptive of the 
subject, and although they must not be a contradiction to the subject( whether 
the female parent has given birth or not is not a direct contradiction of her 
being a mother), something more is required of them. There is deductive logic 
inherent in the formulation of  Kant’s maxims such as in the mathematics 
behind a scientific theory. Scientific theory itself is a good example of a 
posteriori (experience based) knowledge and much as any scientific theory 
that lives up to its mathematics is a good guide to future science, the moral 
laws that survive Kant’s maxims are a good guide to future action. Likewise, 
when Kant’s maxim of universality has been properly and rationally 
understood as it can and should by rational creatures such as ourselves, even 
if imperfectly so, the binding effect of the duty associated with the maxim 
should not allow for other actions: You ought to and are duty bound to intend 
and act morally in such a fashion as everyone ought to intend and do in all 
cases. 
 The humanity formula can easily be considered in the light of natural 
rights. Since no person ought to be considered only as a means to an end, 
they have a certain right to be viewed as either a means and an end, or 
preferably only as an end in themselves. That is, a person is worth more than 
any means to an end ever could be. People have an inalienable worth merely 
by their being a rational human being. It is therefore their right as rational 
beings that they not be used by others as a means to an end. People, rather, 
are  parallel ends to oneself, and all these ends have an equivalent tangible 
worth which cannot be stated in terms of the worth of the ends any individual 
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might have.  
 It is of interest here to consider different types of professional ethics 
which at times suggest levels of differentiation, that is that certain professions 
somehow create valuable situations which outweigh normal moral maxims. 
Each profession has its own sets of values and rules which naturally take 
place within the framework of that profession. However is it possible to 
reasonably argue that these contingencies should ever take precedence over 
normal moral maxims? “Central norms of various professions must take their 
place in the common moral framework that provides such overriding reasons: 
in situations in which these norms determine only hypothetical imperatives, in 
which they are normally overridden by other more stringent duties, they 
cannot be elevated to ultimate prominence. It is a truism that professionals, 
like everyone else, ought to do what is morally required of them in all 
circumstances,” (Goldman,1980, 9). However, Goldman is quick to point out, 
as Kant also often states, the imperfect nature of the rational human being, 
and as such there are certainly circumstances in which a strong sort of ethical 
differentiation takes place. Goldman goes on to consider this in terms of 
various professions, amongst those business. Goldman concludes with the 
deontological debunking of utilitarianism, that so long as rights are part of the 
moral equation, no aggregate utility could ever outweigh those rights in any 
moral calculation. Kant might merely have considered this a good example of 
the application of the maxim concerning humanity: “If people are not justified 
in imposing harms to secure conveniences, then business managers cannot 
appeal to desires for such conveniences to justify imposing risks or 
harms,”(Goldman,1980, 260).  
 The third version of the categorical imperative, that of autonomy, shows 
how  this imperative is the rational result of logic and each person should be 
able to follow and create these rules themselves. That is, the lawmaker is 
oneself, and one is therefore ultimately responsible for creating maxims in 
accordance with the categorical imperative. The incentive for following moral 
laws must come from oneself, and one has a duty to oneself, humanity and 
rationality as such  to follow these laws. A person who has learned 
(theoretically or practically) how to be a good friend, would feel duty bound 
towards that friendship and would not feel that being a bad friend was an 
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option of any sort. And I suggest that similarly, Kant would have us feel duty 
bound to his a priori synthetic categorical imperative should we come to 
understand it properly. Although it is a logical deduction it is not based upon 
experience nor is it self-descriptive, and this in itself discloses that it is not 
necessarily obvious to human reason (or any rational being). The Categorical 
imperative is always preceded by an ‘ought’ to reflect its commanding 
character (it is imperative), and yet “Imperatives say that something would be 
good to do or to refrain from doing, but they say it to a will that does not 
always therefore do something simply because it has been represented to the 
will as something good to do,” (Kant,1993, 413). The imperative is categorical 
in that it applies to all rational beings in all categories, and is an action that is 
willed in itself objectively, and not as a means to something else desired (this 
would, as mentioned earlier, be a hypothetical imperative as it is dependent 
upon the individual and the conditions). “An imperative thus says what action 
possible by me would be good, and it presents the practical rule in relation to 
a will which does not forthwith perform an action simply because it is good, 
partly because the subject does not always know that the action is good and 
partly because (even if he does know it is good) his maxims might yet be 
opposed to the objective principles of practical reason,” (Kant,1993, 414). 
 The final version of the categorical imperative is that of the kingdom of 
ends. What Kant appears to be implying here is that we must all act together 
in accordance with the maxims created by the legislator, which as we know 
from the previous section must be any particular individual as much as 
anyone else. These autonomous workings would be in a ‘systematic 
connection’ (Kant,1993, 433) revealing both ends that are particular to the 
individual and the individuals as ends. “The practical necessity of acting 
according to this principle, i.e., duty, does not rest at all on feelings, impulses, 
and inclinations, but only on the relation of rational beings to one another, a 
relation in which the will of a rational being must always be regarded at the 
same time as legislative, because otherwise he could not be thought of as an 
end in himself,” (Kant,1993, 434). That is, Kant is aware that one is often 
drawn in a direction other than that suggested by the categorical imperative, 
and one must therefore be wary of these in contrast with rationality. As 
imperfect beings, humans have these feelings, impulses and inclinations 
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which are hypothetical imperatives. They are statements for actions, but we 
must be wary that we at the same time create a ‘kingdom’ that allows for a 
universal autonomy and pursuit of morally acceptable ends. It is our duty as 
rational human beings to be aware of the worth of humans as ends in 
themselves and afford them (and ourselves) the dignity that follows from their 
human condition. This human dignity is not something that can be given a 
price, and, as Goldman said, human rights must therefore outweigh any form 
of aggregate utility. “Morality is the relation of actions to the autonomy of 
will,”(Kant, 1993, 439), and it is any rational beings duty (which is objectively 
necessary in order not to contradict reason) to perform good actions which 
follow the inherent logic of the categorical imperative since people are 
imperfect creatures with many feelings, impulses and inclinations which are 
not necessarily good (as experience amply shows). 
  Similar to our previous discussions, this discussion of the 
Kantian Deontological Ethics was put forth in an effort to discover which core 
words might be useful in finding whether businesses adhere to a deontological 
type ethic. I herewith offer the following words as the best sources of 
comparison value: Universal - In that any rule (maxim) must apply to all, 
completely independent of circumstance; rationality: in that a moral decision 
follows certain logical precedent’s; humanity- in that actions must be taken in 
the view of all of humanity, and never just one situations or person; autonomy-  
in that people have an inherent worth just on the basis of their dignity and 
rationality as human beings; duty- in that we have an obligation to follow these 
rules and maxims; and imperfect- in that people are prone to mistakes and 
misunderstandings of both the rules and their will. 
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Care Ethics 
 
 The fourth type of normative ethical theory I will be discussing in the 
scope of this paper is that of Care Ethics. Care ethics is the only ethical theory 
presented which is a uniquely feminist ethic, however that does not imply that 
it only applies to women, rather that it takes traditionally female trait of caring 
for others as its moral starting point. Caring is defined by Held as: “attending 
to and meeting the needs of the particular others for whom we take 
responsibility,” (Held, 2006, 10). That is, the ethics of care takes into account 
the dependency of people at various stages of their lives upon others, and the 
accountabilities we have to our particular chosen others in caring for them. A 
mother does not choose any child to care for, she chooses her child and she 
cares for her child in what she perceives to be the best manner possible or the 
thriving and growing of her child. This is a pressing need for a mother, and not 
one that she can give up easily. The child, furthermore, needs care to survive 
at all and therefore its life is literally in the hands of its mother.  
 In this, the ethics of care diverges strongly from the modern notion, of 
which all the other ethical theories mentioned are prone, of the ideal individual 
as independent, autonomous and rational. These ethical systems overlook 
certain aspects of human life and the reality of what most people feel called 
and duty bound to perform. If all actions demand ethical contemplation, then it 
is clear that caring for the particular other is at the very least an ethical act on 
the same lines as helping a stranger. Care ethicists like Held would claim that 
the care that is given to the particular other is of a higher standard than that 
given to a universal cause, although the ethics of care can be extrapolated to 
universal notions of justice and politics on a global level. Care ethicists would 
claim that an abstraction cannot claim priority over the actual claims a real 
situation has over one. “To most advocates of the ethics of care, the 
compelling moral claim of the particular other may be valid even when it 
conflicts with the requirement usually made by moral theories that moral 
judgments be universalize able, and this is of fundamental moral importance, 
“(Held, 2006, 11). The problem of the universalizing seems to lie in the 
distinction between the personal and the public spheres. The personal sphere, 
the home and family, has not traditionally been seen to be a situation in which 
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ethical behaviour can take place. Of course there have always been instances 
of severely unethical behaviour in the home, and Care Ethicists would suggest 
that there are always ethics present and that one is just as exposed to ethical 
circumstances at home as one is in the public sphere. However, home 
circumstances can not be universalized, and what applies for one family in 
one situation, does not necessarily apply to another in a similar situation. 
Families are also different from the public sphere in that not all parties 
involved will necessarily be equal (this is not the case in the public sphere 
either, when actual circumstances are taken in to account, however it is the 
universal ideal for relations and contracts in the public sphere, although the 
specifics need not be identical). Universal rules do not work in circumstances 
with clear inequalities (like the relationship between mother and child), and the 
approach of the care ethicists leans strongly towards evaluation and guidance 
instead of hard and fast rules.  
 It has therefore also been suggested that this pinnacle of care in ethics 
is a type of Aristotelian Virtue, and it is similar in that is a kind of middle 
ground of attitudes and actions. To care for someone is both theoretical and 
practical, and what Aristotle’s comment about theory being blind without 
praxis rings very true for caring as well. Furthermore, emotions are a salient 
force in doing and discovering the good, and can be cultivated in a similar 
manner to Aristotelian sentiments. Rationality and emotions must inform each 
other to have a completely human moral picture. Rationalistic moral theories 
such as Utilitarianism and Deontology reject emotions which they suggest 
sabotage  their overarching norms and neutrality through self-absorbed, 
preferential, hostile and vindictive attitudes. Care ethics would suggest that 
these are the negative extremes on the emotional slope, and demonstrate 
why a cultivated emotion would allow the correct sentiments to pop up in the 
particular situation. It would also suggest that emotions on the other extreme, 
so called ‘excessively good’ emotions such as helpfulness and altruism, can 
be equally as bad as the above mentioned negative emotions both for the 
persons being cared for (they could be tyrannized by the process) and for the 
carer (who could forget to care for themselves). “The extremes of ‘selfish 
behaviour’ and ‘humanity’ are recognized, but what lies between these is often 
overlooked,” (Held, 2006, 12). What the ethics of care suggests is that human 
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behaviour is not always selfish or altruistic, and that the notion of the 
individual is a rampant myth: a person’s “interests are intertwined with the 
persons they care for,” (Held, 2006, 12). However, traditional Virtue Ethics 
was not particularly interested in nor did it delve very far into typically female 
ways of being. And, for better or for worse, caring is a typically female trait 
and manner of seeing the world. Women are historically the carers of society, 
although there does not seem to be any deductive reason for this beyond their 
actual capacity for bearing children. There are plenty of examples of men who 
are equally caring, and it is therefore not necessarily the woman who 
demonstrates the typical caring type behaviour associated with the word 
mother, Care Ethics therefore defines itself as a feminist (rather than 
feminine) ethic. The focal point of virtue ethics is character and practice, as 
has been mentioned before, and although important, the relational aspect is 
not the focal point in Virtue Ethics. Care Ethics would propose that all people 
are constantly striving to maintain and stimulate real relationships between 
themselves and their particular other. It is this established relationship which 
holds the essence of moral worth in the ethics of care, and it is through this 
lens of the relational person that values are established. This implies that the 
end of an action for this form of ethics will not be another individualistic goal, 
but rather the actual cooperating process which strengthens the relationship. 
Furthermore, this relationship is not even freely entered into or chosen in any 
way: The ethics of care “sees many of our responsibilities as not freely 
entered into but presented to us by the accidents of our embeddings in familial 
and social and historical contexts. It often calls on us to take responsibility, 
while liberal individualist morality focuses on how we should leave each other 
alone,” (Held, 2006, 14-15). 
 One particularly strong point which care ethics emphasises is that one’s 
circumstances colour the way a situation is seen. These circumstances can 
be described as being in the world, and cannot be wiped away to create a 
carte blanche so as to start afresh: one is born into a certain family, in a 
certain country, with a certain way of being and with a certain history, amongst 
any other manner of ties to the world. All of these paint the way one sees 
circumstances and situations, which then again reflect upon how one sees 
other instances. “Every conscious human being has been cared for as a child 
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and can see the value in the care that shaped him or her; every thinking 
person can recognize the moral worth of the caring relations that gave him or 
her a future. The ethics of care builds on experience that all persons share, 
though they have often been unaware of its embedded values and 
implications, “(Held, 2006, 21). 
 The Ethics of Care is often compared to an Ethic of Justice. “An ethic of 
justice focuses on questions of fairness, equality, individual rights, abstract 
principles, and the consistent application of them. An ethic of care focuses on 
attentiveness, trust, responsiveness to need, narrative nuance, and cultivating 
caring relations,” (Held, 2006, 15). A lot of what the ethic of care refers to here 
was previously thought of as instinctive, and there too by definition not moral 
since it wasn’t a choice of any sort. And although we definitely hesitate in 
swallowing this assumption, what is truly interesting about it is that morality 
requires choice. As any carer would say, caring is all about choice and what is 
best for that particular person. In fact, there is a huge realm of Care Ethics 
that devotes itself exclusively to the amount of choice even in seemingly 
oppressed and manipulated situations, such as Hoagland’s Lesbian Ethics. 
Here Hoagland specifically discusses such issues as the choice made to enter 
slavery by an otherwise hopeless young woman with two young children who 
she could not support, or the always disturbing tale of Sophie’s Choice, in  
which only one of her two small children could be saved in a concentration 
camp. She demands that we recognize that there is still morality in such a 
pressured situation, and that people still choose what they perceive as the 
better option (slavery instead of starving children in one case, and a refusal to 
choose in the other, which is an action in itself, although the result was the 
same). Hoagland uses these examples to demonstrate that not only equals or 
the party with more power in a situation is capable of action and choices. In 
other words, not only equals or the superior party can act ethically. Where 
there is the capacity to make a choice in action, there is the capacity to 
choose ethically, even under circumstances of hardship or duress. 
 What justice does defend, which does not necessarily appear to be the 
focus of care, is equality and freedom. Therefore, it has been supposed by 
some that what an Ethics of Care lacks is justice, perhaps particularly so in 
that it accepts that the world and human life is set up in an unequal fashion as 
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one of its premises in the development of an ethic. Where a historically 
rationalistic ethic might acquiesces that inequality is the case, this is not the 
same as considering inequalities a necessary or sufficient part of an ontology. 
However, in Care Ethics this is precisely the case. We as people are 
inherently embedded and inalienable from a world where inequality is rife in 
every type of relationship and at every level of society. To suggest that this is 
not the case, a Care Ethicist would suggest, is to be idealistic about the nature 
of relationships between people, societies and countries at the very least, not 
to mention the quintessentially equal arrangement of the business contract. 
The very nature of good business seems in some respects to be to take 
advantage of a certain weakness in the other (be that production placement in 
the world because of salary requirements, in having the correct sort of 
information such that one’s personal business is at the forefront of the 
economy, or perhaps even the statement by Marx on the nature of profit being 
not paying the true worth of labour). The Care Ethicist would be likely here to 
comment that so long as the inequality of these relationships continues in an 
unrecognized fashion, there will be no manner in which to ethically approach 
the problems adequately. Consider the relationship between a mother and 
child, where clearly the mother is in the position of power. Should this be a 
relationship of equals, or is there something to be gained by the mother being 
in control? What happens in situations where the mother is not in control? 
Clearly the nature of the mothering relationship is such that the mother should 
be in control of the child and not equal. However, can this type of relationship 
be extrapolated to business and society? Should we expect a business, which 
might have more control over certain resources and goods, to mother the 
consumers to buy the correct ‘good’? Could we expect one country to accept 
the mothering of another wealthier country? Would we believe that either the 
business or the wealthier nation would not take advantage of their situation as 
the responsible party? Care Ethicists might suggest that the reason these 
situations make us instinctively uneasy has nothing to do with the nature of 
the inequality, which we are all aware of, but with the apparent acceptability of 
profiteering at the hands of another’s weakness. It seems that a key ingredient 
of justice is lacking in this description, and that ingredient is care. In caring for 
another, one would want the relationship to thrive: “To characterize a 
52 
 
relationship as satisfactory is to say something different from saying that the 
persons in it as individuals are satisfied with it. It is analogous to the difference 
between judging that a band plays well and judging that its separate members 
play well,” (Held, 2006, 119). That is, we are not looking at the individual parts 
of something to define its success, it is the very relationship as a whole that is 
in focus. One cares for the relationship primarily, and not the person 
individuated. If the corporation cared for the relationship with consumer in this 
manner, or if the wealthier nation cared about the relationship with another 
country in this manner, would inequality have the same destructive power, or 
would it just be a descriptive factor about the relationship? Is the real 
idealization assuming that different parties in a relationship can act equally 
despite evidence to the contrary, or in expecting these parties to care about 
the relationships they foster in a responsible manner? 
 Justice is concerned with equality and freedom, care with relationships 
and collaboration. And Ruddick for one considers these notions two sides of 
the same coin. “Equitable caring is not necessarily better caring, it is fairer 
caring. And humane justice is not necessarily better justice, it is caring 
justice,” (Held, 2006, 16). However, the notion of justice without care is not 
legitimate since the reasons behind the values we associate with justice such 
as equality, freedom, neutrality, unbiased allotment of goods, human rights, 
and penalization are due to the very ability to care, to be empathic and 
sympathetic to the plight of others,  to encourage trust, to concern ourselves 
with the needs of others, and to value the inherent relationship involved 
between all persons (both particular and general). It is not that justice is a sub-
category of care, but rather that caring is a necessary condition for justice to 
exist. The flipside, that of care existing without justice, is clearly possible 
nevertheless. One need merely take into consideration the typical family 
structure to see that although, for example, a women does not necessarily 
have the same opportunities or freedoms as a man, he may care very deeply 
for her all the same. This also does not thereby imply that justice is at a higher 
level, or somehow offers a better sort of caring - it is simply, Held states, a 
more just caring. That is, it is descriptive of the type of care given, rather than 
the pinnacle of ethics that answers all controversies. There are certainly areas 
in which justice will offer the best sort of ethical answer, but there are also 
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circumstances in which justice may well be a bit beside the point. Although we 
may  attempt to offer people the same equality, we do not necessarily care for 
them and the relationship they have with us in this world. Perhaps a 
strengthened relationship would be a more promising avenue? (Take, for 
example, the continuous problem of the Roma in Europe…Does any sort of 
relationship even exist?) In essence what Care Ethics demands is an 
investment in understanding the other, as well as a response from this other, 
and a valuable relationship. A relationship which neither party would willingly 
give up because of the very nature of intermingled interests. This is no throw 
away ethic to be used and discarded until the next debate pops up, but an 
unceasing culture for life. 
 Similar to our previous discussions, this discussion of the Ethics of 
Care was put forth in an effort to discover which core words might be useful in 
finding whether businesses adhere to a care type ethic. I herewith offer the 
following words as the best sources of comparison value: Care - in that caring 
is the most fundamental value and emotion; relational-  in that it is the 
relationship between people which is of primary importance; personal- in that 
those relations which are closest to one are of particular importance; 
understanding: in that emphasis is placed upon empathy and sympathy; 
choice- as in the mode of ethics; and feminist- in that men and women are 
equally capable of caring and ethics. 
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Pragmatism 
 Pragmatist philosophy appears to be an attempt to change the way we 
think about philosophy. It is initially interested in dropping the debate of god’s 
existence, as it sees this as a somewhat useless discussion. But it is perhaps 
most particularly interested in altering the way we discuss philosophical terms 
such as truth, good or any other descriptive adjective that has been singled 
out and focused upon since Plato’s initial discussions. A pragmatist firmly 
holds that knowing more about the nature of truth (as such, as an object) will 
not be helpful in the ultimate goal of being more truthful. And similarly not of 
the essence of the good (that which is similar in all things good) in being good. 
The pragmatist refuses to take part in the traditional allocation of philosophers 
into the categories of continental and analytical as the pragmatist would 
suggest that both categories submit to the initial rules and definitions set by 
Plato (finding essences, generalizing this essence, etc). The continental 
philosopher is intent on focusing whole-heartedly on statements which tell us 
how to live our lives in accordance with principles such as goodness while 
considering a stated circumstance such as rain an uninteresting truth. The 
analytical philosopher flips the association and considers the statement of the 
happening of rain an example of truth as such, while normative statements 
regarding how one should live are merely a reflection of emotion. And yet both 
remain firmly focused on the truth, the good, et al. Both parties still think there 
is some sort of reflection or correlation which can illuminate the human 
condition. The pragmatist remarks that this association tells us nothing and, 
“he drops the notion of truth as corresponding with reality altogether,” (Rorty, 
1982, xvii). The pragmatist considers this correlation to be begging the 
question since we are defining truth as equivalent to what we perceive, and 
what we perceive as reality and thus truth. 
 A pragmatist would not, therefore, believe there to be any ultimate 
truth, or good or force for which a person should be ethical or moral. However, 
in as much as ethics and morality is useful in attaining ends, there are values 
and criteria which are worth following. These are all decided upon by people, 
and it is meaningless to consider them or their consequences without 
considering people at the same time. Just as the pragmatist considers 
analyses of language in the abstract which do not take place in a particular 
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circumstance with particular people, to be empty and ‘missing the point’, so 
too a pragmatic ethics can only be considered in the particular situation with 
set people and an isolated problem. Our customs, habits and words shape the 
edges of our asserted knowledge, and we cannot escape the human 
condition. Our condition determines what we perceive as useful and what we 
choose to do, but it does not in any way correlate to any sort of ultimate 
reality. “ For the pragmatists, the pattern of all inquiry - scientific as well as 
moral - is deliberation concerning relative attractions of various concrete 
alternatives,” (Rorty, 1982, 164). That is, for the pragmatist, there is no 
ultimate answer to right and wrong, there is not something that is true and 
something that is false, there is no thing which is inherently good and another 
which is inherently evil. These words are a human creation and as such they 
evaluate and describe human situations. Without the humans present in the 
description, they are empty: like the milkman with no milk to deliver: without 
the milk, there is no milkman. The situation is not right without a human 
chosen definition of rightness to that specific circumstance, not true without a 
reason why truth is necessary, not good without the human being that is 
choosing to deliberately be  and define the good in it. These are steps that are 
taken, points that are held, words that are used in order to achieve goals that 
are humanly designed and created. If the steps do not ultimately lead to 
chosen goals, they are not useful, not informative, not practical - and should 
therefore be open to debate and change. Any attempt to listen to some 
ultimate truth, good, or force, suggests the pragmatist, ends the conversation 
in an unproductive fashion. “Our identification with our community -  our 
society, our political tradition, our intellectual heritage - is heightened when we 
see this community as ours rather than nature’s, shaped rather than found, 
one among many which men have made,” (Rorty, 1982, 166). What we as 
humans participate in is an error prone, fleeting human project says the 
pragmatist, and not some predetermined, eternal supreme purpose. 
 This seems to suggest relativism, that any project would be as good as 
any other since there is nothing ultimate by which to judge the human project. 
How could we possibly know what is best? And the pragmatist might answer: 
any decision based upon some sort of ultimate superior superhuman 
judgement is to a certain extent relativistic- at least in a metaphysical sense. 
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That is, any set of virtues might be equally good as another similar set, any 
set of rules as useful as another according to some higher standard, and 
when these sets of virtues or rules are debated it is the higher standard that is 
debated since theoretically it is the higher standard from which the rules 
follow. But when real rules are set, no-one needs a higher standard to 
understand why the virtues or rules would be useful. To kill is not good, not 
because God says so, but because it would not be a good prospering strategy 
for the human race. The God argument here does not explain the why of not 
killing, it is an abstraction of the why. Similarly, there is no God who defines 
the values upon which the scientific method is based, and which absolutely 
sets the standard for how and why science should be practiced. These 
scientific values (such as precision, accuracy, experimentation, reproducibility, 
honesty, amongst others) are to some extent relative as there is no absolute 
grounding for them, but were discovered to be useful through a hard practical 
process of trial and error. There was nothing that proved that these values are 
the absolute right ones. These values were humanly chosen as good pegs 
upon which to base science. And likewise ethical values and standards are 
good pegs upon which to base action. There must, pragmatically speaking, 
therefore be a constant conversation analysing these values and changing the 
values, in the event that such a change proves more useful to us as humans. 
That values and ideas are treated as fact, that scientific theories are treated 
as fact, does not mean they are fact or that they correspond to an ultimate 
reality as such, only that they are the most useful notions we have found up to 
this point in a particular practical situation. To consider fact reality mistakes 
the idea of finding truth with the project that is called science or with the guide 
to human action which is called ethics. That is, it mistakes the ultimate goal of 
science to be an accurate theory, or the ultimate goal of ethics to be a firm 
rule, while the end in both cases is actually the conversation with other 
similarly minded people. In both cases, there are practical applications which 
prove or disprove said theory or rule, and which can then reform said theory 
or rule. But these theories and rules are merely temporary pegs up a climbing 
wall of our own creation that has no purpose other than the climb. The 
placement of the pegs, the theories and the rules, are in this sense arbitrary, 
and just a way of furthering the conversation. Is the goal then to reach the top 
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of the wall? The top of the mountain? One universal rule from which all others 
will follow? The goal is quite literally the climb and the conversation, as there 
is no end, no ultimate truth. There is no ultimate inherent all-encompassing 
ethic according to the pragmatist. And yet we must continue the project of 
creating a contingent human ethic. 
 The pragmatist, as a result, must answer the traditionalist on the 
following: “the practical question of whether the notion of ‘conversation’ can 
substitute for that of ‘reason’. ‘Reason,’ as the term is used in the Platonic or 
Kantian traditions, is interlocked with the notions of truth as correspondence, 
of knowledge as discovery of essence, of morality as obedience to principle, 
all the notions which the pragmatist tries to deconstruct,” (Rorty, 1982, 172). 
And the response the traditionalist tries to give is that without these ultimate 
‘reasons’, without the correspondence, without the essence, without the 
principle there will be no conversation. The traditionalist suggests that we 
would have a blank slate, and simply fall down the mountain of a worthwhile 
pursuit. However, the pragmatist would respond that we are aiming at 
something, and it is this aim that sets the conversation. It is a movement, an 
evolution of sorts, towards a goal rather than the goal itself that grounds the 
conversation. The pragmatist would refer to Isaac Newton’s famous quote of 
standing on the shoulders of giants, and furthermore suggest that our 
shoulders should also be stood upon such that ethics can continue to evolve 
into something more useful for humanity.  
 This does not suggest that some of the other normative ethical systems 
should not be used, nor that they are not used in a proper fashion to resolve 
ethical dilemmas. What it does mean is that, as with the field of science, there 
is a progress which takes place in ethics. Therefore, what may have been an 
ethically appropriate action to take one hundred years ago (or in a different 
country or culture) is not ethically appropriate today in our time, culture or 
country. This is not reflective of an ethically relativistic position of anything 
goes position. This does not imply that there is no right and wrong, any 
pragmatist would refute such a statement immediately. The pragmatist would 
rather say that the question has been inappropriately posed:  there is no 
absolute right and wrong apart from what we as people consider to be right 
and wrong in concrete situations (in much the same way as there is no 
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absolute perfect creation to which animals on earth aim to evolve, rather only 
specific animals that have evolved to function in specific ways in specific 
situations). The pragmatist would be keen to suggest that ethics might evolve 
in a fashion similar to Kuhn’s scientific paradigms. Everyone within a given 
paradigm would follow certain rules and agree to certain principles, but that 
these always contain anomalies, and ethical dilemmas, which a paradigm 
cannot explain since it can never be completely correspondent with reality. 
Nor could we as people even have some way of estimating to what extent our 
ideas correspond with some ideal reality. What it does suggest is that our 
humanly created vision of reality changes, and with it the theories and rules 
that maintain it as our reality. Although it is not changing into some sort of 
perfect understanding of the ultimate reality, it is changing into a more useful, 
informative and practical paradigm for what is humanly defined as useful, 
informative and practical. The truthfulness of any principle or thesis depends 
upon whom it should be true for: these notions are not relative statements of 
fancies and preferences nor innate perfect moral imperatives , but are 
pragmatic hypotheses in the conversation that searches for ideal norms in 
human achievements. 
 Pragmatism can be confused with an existentialist philosophy due to  
meaning and truth being humanly defined. Both schools hold that meaning is 
humanly created, however where existentialism relies on the individual choice 
of giving meaning to his or her life due to the inherent lack thereof, the 
pragmatist uses theories and rules inherited through history as tools,  with a 
strong preference for those that are most useful in furthering the human 
project. Human achievements are not existential in nature according to the 
pragmatist, as they are not randomly chosen. There are manners in which 
humans thrive better, and these can be discovered through an analyses of the 
consequences of actions. These analyses of consequences are the thrust 
behind any pragmatic, and thus thoroughly practical, process. Existentialism, 
on the other hand, would have us believe that there is no value or meaning 
other than what the individual puts into a situation. Whereas a pragmatist 
would allow us to judge how well an action works for people, and if it is 
successful in fulfilling its purpose, the existentialist would be questioning the 
purpose. Pragmatism is a philosophy of finding meaning in appropriate action, 
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where existentialism is the philosophy of finding meaning in the absurd. The 
existentialists held the absurdly chosen value of freedom as their ultimate 
virtue in ethics. That is, the purpose of human ethics is to promote human 
freedom both on an individual and social plan, according to existentialist 
ethics. The pragmatic, of course, does not search for any ultimate goal to 
strive for, and rather focuses on what is most useful in the here and now 
contingent situation. Pragmatist ethics is an evolving animal with its sight on 
the niche of what practically boosts human survival.  
 “In philosophy of science, at least since the ‘Kuhnian turn’, it has no 
longer been a matter of course to differentiate sharply between the 
justification and discovery contexts. But in ethics, this is still very much the 
case. Here the entire emphasis lies upon the justification of moral judgments 
while scant attention is paid to discovering new, hypothetical constructions, 
with which to deal with emergent moral problems, “(Keulartz, Korthals, 
Schermer, Swierstra, 2002, 13). Ethics is so concerned with finding a 
grounding for its principles, ethical discussions so focused on justification, that 
new concepts are hardly considered. Unfortunately, in a world which moves 
as quickly as business and technology, this means that to some extent ethics 
lags behind the times. Thus, the great punch for the pragmatist is trying to see 
an ethical dilemma from all angles and discovering which angle, if any, is the 
most useful. If a particular dilemma should happen to fall outside of any 
ethical system, and poses a sort of ethical anomaly, here the true force of 
pragmatism comes to fruition. The pragmatist would press on and try to create 
and discover a way to deal with the dilemma, creating new systems, new 
vocabularies, new theories, rather than relegating it to future generations or 
considering it beside the point (as often happens in ethical thought 
experiments of the it is not our problem variety). New tools are imperative to 
growth and progress, and since ethical systems are merely pegs upon the 
climbing wall of ethical conversation, it is possible to stretch and create a new 
more useful peg upon which new ideas can rest. 
 Similar to our previous discussions, this discussion of Pragmatism  was 
put forth in an effort to discover which core words might be useful in finding 
whether businesses adhere to a pragmatism type ethic. I herewith offer the 
following words as the best sources of comparison value: Progress - in that 
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ethics is evolving to meet a human demand for appropriate action, and that of 
focusing on development instead of justification; practical-  in that pragmatism 
focuses on what is most useful for people; social- in that pragmatism 
considers people as a social group, and the conversation between these vital; 
non-foundationalist: in that there is no ultimate force, truth or goodness behind 
chosen values, reality is an illusion, and every human project is fallible; non-
dualist: in that there are no two sides to objects (no appearance and essence, 
no practice and theory, no fact and value etc). On the other hand, this duality 
can be useful for practical purposes so long as it is understood to be a 
construct for practical purposes; scientific method- as in the mode of 
pragmatism, the manner in which people can discover what ethical actions are 
most appropriate. 
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Summary of Ethical Terms 
 
Utilitarianism 
Utility - in that actions should be evaluated in terms of their propensity to 
promote the desirable;  
happiness - in that happiness is the ultimate end of all things desirable; 
revisionist - in that rules can be altered to bring about a better result; 
secular - in that people determine their own values and desires in setting their 
goals;  
real- in that we should live ourselves on our own equal terms. 
mathematical- in that mathematical formulas can give us the answers to 
ethical questions 
 
Virtue Ethics Pegs 
Ethical (or moral) - in that there are correct or higher standards (character 
traits) which should be followed in a manner akin to virtues (actions are not 
empty of content);  
particular-  in that each situation is considered in its singularity, and not as a 
result of rules for all; discussion- in that controversial circumstances and ideas 
can be contended; 
Educational- in that ethical issues, ideas, practices and emotions can be 
learned;  
wisdom- a person gains knowledge with practice and knowledge 
emotional- a person’s emotional response is valid, and be correctly or 
incorrectly expressed, as well as dulled. 
justice- in that circumstances should be fair to all and lawful. 
 
Deontological 
Universal - In that any rule (maxim) must apply to all, completely independent 
of circumstance;  
Rationality- in that a moral decision follows certain logical precedent’s; 
humanity- in that actions must be taken in the view of all of humanity, and 
never just one situations or person;  
autonomy-  in that people have an inherent worth just on the basis of their 
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dignity and rationality as human beings;  
duty- in that we have an obligation to follow these rules and maxims;  
imperfect- in that people are prone to mistakes and misunderstandings of 
both the rules and their will. 
 
Care Ethics 
Care - in that caring is the most fundamental value and emotion; 
relational-  in that it is the relationship between people which is of primary 
importance;  
personal- in that those relations which are closest to one are of particular 
importance;  
Understanding- in that in that emphasis is placed upon empathy and 
sympathy;  
choice- as in the mode of ethics;  
feminist- in that men and women are equally capable of caring and ethics. 
 
Pragmatism 
Progress - in that ethics is evolving to meet a human demand for appropriate 
action, and that of focusing on development instead of justification;  
practical-  in that pragmatism focuses on what is most useful for people; 
social- in that pragmatism considers people as a social group, and the 
conversation between these vital;  
non-foundationlist- in that there is no ultimate force, truth or goodness 
behind chosen values, reality is an illusion, and every human project is fallible; 
non-dualist- in that there are no two sides to objects (no appearance and 
essence, no practice and theory, no fact and value etc). On the other hand, 
this duality can be useful for practical purposes so long as it is understood to 
be a construct for practical purposes;  
scientific method- as in the mode of pragmatism, the manner in which 
people can discover what ethical actions are most appropriate. 
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Analysis of Statistics: 
 
 In considering the ethics of companies, I decided upon six main terms, 
and a handful of synonyms for these main terms, for each normative ethic. 
How companies use ethical terms was evaluated. These companies were 
then assessed as to whether they could be understood through a normative 
ethical field. There are obviously some areas where such a placement within 
an ethic will prove to be difficult. I specifically looked at Statoil, collecting 
statistics for analysis of this well-known company, and then looked at how 
they implement this in the real-world. Such discussions tend to progress in the 
wake of large ethical crises, as was shown by several examples in the chapter 
on the history of business ethics. This is a potential means of measuring the 
ethical progress of a company on an ongoing basis, measuring up the claimed 
ethical profile against the reality of the companies actions. In addition, I have 
collected statistics for several other companies, which appear in the 
addendum for comparative interest.  
 In the analysis of Statoil there was a bias towards utilitarianism and 
pragmatism in the Complete Data diagram on page 82 of the Addendum. This 
is perhaps as expected; these normative ethics are those which appear to be 
most embraced by the business world. Utility is clearly a word that is highly 
associated with the business world, as is practicality. However, one look at the 
Key Terms in Values and Guidelines graph on page 79 of the Addendum 
shows us that there is in fact no usage whatsoever in either Statoil’s company 
values or in the ethical guidelines of the key utilitarian terms. Pragmatics is 
also very poorly represented in this graph, while the normative ethical field 
that come out at the top is Care Ethics. This is somewhat surprising 
considering the company’s leanings according to the Complete Data Graph. 
The 2011 Statoil Annual Report, furthermore, does use some of the key terms 
associated with each normative ethic. However The Key Words in the Annual 
Report graph on page on page 80 shows that there is a clear weighting 
towards care ethics, followed by Pragmatism. If we furthermore look at the 
synonym usage in The Synonyms in Values and Guidelines graph on page 
81, Care Ethics again comes out on top for Statoil, although here 
Utilitarianism suddenly appears in second place again. And finally the 
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synonym usage in the Synonyms in the Annual Report graph on page 83 
shows that Utilitarianism and Pragmatism are the most represented in terms 
of synonyms of normative terms, although the distinctions are not as vast as 
on some of the other graphs (and in fact, here Care Ethics comes out at the 
bottom of Statoil’s scale). It is also clear that Statoil should not fall within the 
category of Deontological Ethics. 
Pragmatism and Virtue Ethics emerge near the top of some of Statoil’s  
graphs, but the placement for Statoil nevertheless appears to be either 
Utilitarianism or Care Ethics. Or to be specific, Utilitarianism appears to be the 
choice when the company as a whole is taken into account, while when ethics 
is being deliberately discussed there is a very purposeful  inclusion of terms 
from the normative field of Care Ethics. 
 Just out of interest, I will briefly discuss several other companies, 
although these will not be further discussed after this. Considering Telenor, 
we see again that according to the Complete Data Graph on page 82, 
Utilitarianism comes out on top. For Telenor, however, Virtue Ethics follows 
close on the heels of Utilitarianism. When we come to the Key Terms in 
Values and Guidelines Graph on page 79, Utilitarian terms are not 
represented at all. Care Ethics, like in the case of Statoil, come out at the top 
of Telenor’s scale, followed by Virtue Ethics. In Telenor’s 2011 Annual Report, 
according to the Key Words Annual Report Graph on page 80, Pragmatism 
provides the most commonly used key terms, followed by Utilitarianism. When 
we move over to synonyms, Utilitarianism again comes out on top, closely 
followed by deontological synonyms in the Synonyms in Values and 
Guidelines Graph on page 81. In the Synonyms in the Annual Report Graph 
on page 83, Utilitarianism comes out on top again. This suggests that despite 
the fact that Utilitarian values are deliberately left out of the discussion of 
Telenor’s values, Telenor’s ethics fall within the normative field of 
Utilitarianism. It does appear to be the case, however, that Telenor would like 
to be seen as a company with a basis in Care Ethics. 
 Next to be analysed is Hydro. In the Complete Data Diagram on page 
82, Utilitarianism once again comes out on top, while Virtue Ethics, 
Deontology and Pragmatism come tied in second place. However, once we 
look at the Key Terms in Values & Guidelines graph on page 79, there is no 
65 
 
representation within the fields of either Utilitarianism or Deontology, and Care 
Ethics come out in a clear lead. Meanwhile, the Key Words in the Annual 
Report Graph on page 80 has the highest representation in Pragmatism, 
followed by Virtue Ethics. In terms of synonyms in the Values and Guidelines 
on page 81, Care Ethics and Utilitarianism come out with the greatest word 
usage, while in the Synonyms in Annual Report graph on page 83, it was 
weighted towards Utilitarianism again. Care Ethics again appears to be the 
normative system that Hydro is aiming at, while the graphs show that Hydro’s 
ethics also fall within the field of Utilitarianism. 
 Sykepleieforbund has the most equal ethical term usage according to 
the Complete Data graph on page 82, with Care Ethics just barely coming out 
on top. However, when the Key Terms in Values and Guidelines graph on 
page 79 is taken into account, it is easy to see that Sykepleieforbundet uses a 
lot more ethical terms than the other companies, and that these are 
concentrated in the fields of Virtue Ethics and Care Ethics. In the Key Words 
Annual Report graph on page 80, Sykepleieforundet has clearly landed in the 
field of Care Ethics in terms of Key Words. Interestingly, when synonyms are 
taken into account in the Synonyms in Values and Guidelines graph on page 
81, suddenly deontology comes out on top, however, closely followed by 
Utilitarianism. Pragmatism, Virtue Ethics and Care Ethics, respectively, come 
out not far from each other in a middle range. Synonyms in the Values and 
Guidelines are much higher, while in the annual report they are far lower than 
the other companies. Pragmatism does have the highest representation for 
synonyms in the Annual Report graph on page 83 The other normative fields 
were not far behind, however. Sykepleieforbundet appears to be aiming at 
Care Ethics, but with a Virtue Ethics in a good second place. It is definitely 
clear, however, that Utilitarianism and Pragmatism have a place in their 
practical ethics. 
 Finally we have Oslo Kommune: according to the Complete Data graph 
on page 82, they focus on deontological ethics, again followed by Care Ethics. 
The Key Terms in Values and Guidelines graph on page 79, analysis shows 
that Virtue Ethics is best represented, however. The same is true for the Key 
Words in the Annual Report graph on page 80, which however does show an 
emphasis on Pragmatism as well. The synonyms in the Values and 
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Guidelines graph on page 81 show an emphasis on Care Ethics, while 
synonyms in the Annual Report graph on page 83 again show Deontology in 
first place. Oslo Kommune is presenting themselves as having a Care Ethic. 
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Statoil and the Canadian Oils Sands 
 Statoil’s involvement in the Canadian Tar Sands in Northern Alberta is 
an illustration of a business dilemma. Statoil has for a long time been known 
as a particularly environmentally friendly and moral oil company. Not only 
have they been low polluters in comparison to other oil companies, but their 
workforce and human rights interests have been generally commendable. 
Therefore, many were shocked when Statoil bought into what, as Henry 
Waxman called it, “the dirtiest project on Earth”. There are a number of sides 
to the debate, but the main two issues at hand are  pollution and climate 
change versus concerns about securing future energy sources. The oil sands, 
which are a type of viscous and dense tar-like petroleum deposit, can go 
under a number of different names: tar sands, extra heavy oil, bituminous 
sands, unconventional oil and even crude bitumen (crude oil on the other 
hand refers to conventional or traditional oil from wells). The deposits are 
bitumen mixed with sand, clay, and water. There are many such deposits 
around the world, and there is a long history of humanity using them (the 
legendary Tower of Babel was held together with bitumen). The largest 
deposit of tar sands in  a politically stabile economy is the aforementioned one 
found in Alberta, Canada (the second largest is found in Venezuela). China, in 
particular, finds the tar sands highly intriguing and is perhaps not as 
concerned with either pollution or other factors involved.  
 The tar sands industry is said by environmentalists to produce 
anywhere from two to seven times more greenhouse gas per produced barrel 
of oil than conventional industry (America‘s EPA suggests that tar sands 
produce 82% more greenhouse gases than conventional crude), not to 
mention other factors such as local environmental and health issues, and the 
destruction of the boreal forests of Canada. Both sides of the debate agree, 
however,  with Rebecca Ryall’s statement that the “majority of carbon dioxide 
is created when fuel is burned in cars or factories or jets. Consumption is 
78%-80% of emissions.” The Association of Petroleum Producers stands by a 
statement that tar sands produce oil that is 5-10% worse than conventional oil 
when the entire lifespan of the oil is considered. Of course, if the target goal is 
the reduction of CO2 emissions, as the Kyoto Protocol demands, then tar 
sands are a step in the wrong direction either way. It might be worth adding 
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that forests are a carbon sink, and that their depletion alone will increase the 
atmospheric levels of greenhouse gases. 
 However, the Oil industry presents a pretty picture of low impact 
extraction of oil from pits deep beneath the surface in the Albertan forests. As 
the deposits are anywhere from 300-500 meters below the surface, 40 meters 
thick and extending over several kilometres, standard open-pit mining 
practices cannot be used. Therefore Statoil, along with various other 
companies, have developed a ‘new’ in-situ method SAGD (Steam Assisted 
Gravity Drainage) for bitumen extraction which involves sending processed 
steam deep into the deposits. This causes an emulsion of bitumen and steam 
to form which can be more easily pumped up to the surface for further 
processing with ‘light oil’ to separate the water. This water is then processed 
such that 90% is fit to be sent down to the bitumen deposits again, while a  
‘small portion must be disposed of to purge the system of salt building up’ 
(Statoil homepage). This figure is also contested by environmentalists, who 
insist that each barrel of oil created requires five barrels of water, and of these 
barrels of water only four can be recycled (that is 20%, not 10% of the water 
used must be purged). Since statistics, not to mention Environmental 
Statistics, have always been an area full of contention with spin doctors 
notorious for making a case for anything given any statistics, it seems wise to 
be aware of the extreme predictions in either direction, but to hold on to a 
stabile middle ground estimate (or perhaps even conservative, to be on the 
side of the oil companies). It seems clear that few would be interested in 
pursing oil in a world which has been completely environmentally destroyed. 
The oil would then be worthwhile only in the short-term, not to mention the 
wealth accumulated thereby. Can we have our cake (oil), and be healthy 
(environmental) too? Human psychology, however, suggests otherwise. 
Taking into account the extreme case of the Easter Islands deforestation, it 
also seems clear that people have an ability to live in denial regarding the true 
ramifications of their actions. Someone cut the last tree down on the Easter 
Islands, and likewise it seems that someone will go the mile to get that last 
barrel of oil. Therefore the question, rather than being of whether these oil 
fields should be exploited, should be who should exploit the oil fields. 
 On the 25th of June 2007, Statoil completed the purchase of the North 
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American Oil Sands Corporation (NAOSC), and was expecting the 1,110 
square kilometre area to yield approximately 220,000 barrels of oil per day by 
the end of 2020, when Statoil expects to complete its development phases 
resulting from four Kai Kos Dehseh project leases. Statoil began production in 
early 2011 (two years after its own estimation), and is currently capable of 
producing 18,800 barrels per day at its Leisner Facility according to its 
website dated from the 11.05.2011. Statoil is earnestly researching ways to 
reduce the greenhouse gas emissions associated with  SAGD, and states that 
it has a goal of reducing these emissions by 40% by 2025. Obviously, in both 
cases these are not short term investments, however it is worth restating that 
when the Kyoto agreement suggested restricting greenhouse gases to 5% 
below 1990 levels by 2012, an effort to cut emissions to business as usual 
levels or the lowering of high emissions by 40% (if the tar sands really do 
pollute 5-10% more than conventional oil, this means tar sands pollution 
levels would still be 3-6% higher than conventional oil after a 40% reduction 
by 2025), is simply not good enough. Statoil can be said to be supported in its 
purchase of the Albertan Tar Sands by the Norwegian Government (which is a 
67% shareholder in the company), as the government refuses to take a stand 
on the issue despite its own ethical guidelines where it states in section 2 (3)(c 
) that severe environmental damage would be a reason to exclude investment 
in a company. Perhaps the Norwegian Government, and thus Statoil, simply 
do not see the pollution associated with the tar sands in Alberta as severe. 
 In purely monetary value, the Canadian Oil Sands certainly appear to 
be a good investment, with oil prices rising from under 60 dollars a barrel in 
2005 to  over 140 dollars a barrel in late 2008, to hovering around 100 dollars 
a barrel for the last few years. Oil prices have been rising on aggregate, and 
the oil sands have only recently turned into a profitable venture. Asian nations 
have expressed great interest in the sands, and surely there is an element of 
truth in the statement that a company (and a country, if we consider the 
Norwegian government’s involvement) with a good moral history is more likely 
to take into consideration environmental issues. However, the fact that 
Canada pulled out of the Kyoto agreement altogether does throw a spanner in 
the works in maintaining both Canada’s and Statoil’s moral images. Canada 
would have been liable for a 14 billion dollar fee had they not pulled out of the 
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agreement due to their 20% increase in greenhouse gas emissions. However, 
it is argued that the Kyoto agreement is mute anyway since the two biggest 
polluters in the world, the United States and China, are not members,  with 
China’s Greenhouse emissions having increased by 200% (The Economist, 
2011). In addition, Statoil was fined for water overuse and mismanagement in 
late 2011, as well as providing misleading statements about these events 
(CTVnews,2011). No excesses of pollution are said to have taken place in 
these instances, however. Statoil scored higher within the normative ethical 
field of Utilitarianism in the ethical word analysis I provided through the 
analysis of their website’s ethical guidelines and value statements. This 
suggests that their ethics would be based upon what is of the greatest utility, 
what brings the greatest happiness, that it is an ethics that can be revised with 
changing times and circumstances, that it is not based upon any religious 
views, that it takes real events into consideration, and that it also takes into 
account mathematical analyses. What must be taken into account here then is 
the question of what is the greatest utility: energy security or preserving the 
environment? Does the utility of oil extracted in the tar sands outweigh other 
ethical concerns? Which of these two provides the greatest happiness to all 
those involved? Do we consider all those involved merely Alberta and the 
company Statoil, or do we include Alberta’s nearest neighbours and the world 
as a whole, who are both gaining oil, easy mobility, and independence and yet 
are also paying for the consequences and externalities of the dirty oil 
business? Could there be a situation in which we are able to choose oil now, 
and yet upon becoming aware of unforeseen consequences, reverse policy? 
Should we allow for extra weight to be given to the First Nations aboriginal 
peoples of Alberta? Is there a realistic strategy for capturing the polluting 
gasses that emanate from these oil sands, or is that technology too 
immature?  
 It appears that the question must then be to figure out within which 
ethical field Statoil’s ethical behaviour should be analysed. Is the notion of an 
ethical business possible, and if so is Statoil a representation of such a 
venture? The answer to this question requires assessment of how ethics have 
emerged and morphed within businesses over the preceding decades and 
eons. Prior to the very first ethical or business debates, most businesses 
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could arguably be considered to be pre-ethical, as was the rock or the lion 
discussed earlier in this paper. The ethical ideal to which a philosopher might 
aspire, is certainly not something that is agreed upon even within the oldest of 
ethical discussions. The fact that there is not one clear ethical framework to 
describe this ideal suggests an intangible, fluid and changeable ideal. An ideal 
that grows as mankind grows and at which one can aim. The lenses of the 
different normative fields merely reflect the veracity and actuality of ethics as 
such, while a fully and completely ethical situation remains unattainable. 
However, supposing this ideal could be seen as one end of a spectrum, with 
the other end harbouring the pre-ethical state which lacks any ethical 
consciousness at all, there appears to be a large grey zone of ‘semi-ethical’ 
behavior which falls rather messily within the two ends of this spectrum.  I 
choose  to call this semi-ethical no mans land ‘ethicoid’ (ethics-like). Statoil is 
ethicoid: to answer the question of whether Statoil has met their ethical 
expectations within their self-proclaimed values, the answer appears to be no. 
Statoil’s actions (utilitarian/pragmatic) do not match their value choices (Care 
Ethics). 
 Clearly businesses with an ethical policy could not be described as pre-
ethical, nor as having attained the unattainable. This places them somewhere 
within the ethicoid part of the spectrum. It is clear in the analysis that 
companies like Statoil see their ethical policies through their chosen (the most 
convenient?) lens. For a greater collective ethical consciousness and 
awareness, perhaps the real ideal to aspire to is truth. Hence, companies 
should be encouraged as far as possible to be open to the process of 
examining themselves through as many normative lenses and frameworks as 
are available to them so as to have an educating conversation such as 
Aristotle professed was necessary in the attainment of virtue. Transparency 
and openness to ethical debate and, perhaps prudently, soliciting advice from 
ethicists and professional philosophers would be one manner in which the 
ethical consciousness of business could move closer to the ethical ideal. 
However, we must be aware of one large pitfall. Namely, I have suggested in 
the course of this paper that ethical knowledge appears to go hand in hand 
with ethical responsibility. The more ethically aware one is, the greater one’s 
ethical responsibility. I have suggested that it is illogical to demand ethical 
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behaviour from the pre-ethical situation. However, we must be careful not to 
allow ignorance to be the defence of the unethical. If knowledge implies 
responsibility, then what does this say about accountability? We should not 
accept the weak defence, “I simply didn’t know enough”. Each ethical situation 
must be presented as a springboard towards the ethical ideal. Business must 
therefore have a degree of protection through legislation to discourage 
regressive behaviour and in turn to allow the ethical conversation to take 
place in good faith. 
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Statoil
Utilitarianism
# words in 
texts
# similar 
words in 
ethical 
guidelines
# words in 
company 
values
#similar 
words in 
company 
values
#  words in 
annual 
report
# similar 
words in 
annual 
report
Outcome 
of ethical 
dilemma
Utility 0 28 0 4 1 310 
happiness 0 1 0 1 0 39 
revisionist 0 3 0 2 37 216 
secular 0 23 0 3 11 79 
real 0 18 0 4 0 97 
mathematical 0 1 0 0 0 267 
point sum 0 74 0 14 49 1008 0 
Virtue Ethics
# words in 
texts
# similar 
words in 
ethical 
guidelines
# words in 
company 
values
#similar 
words in 
company 
values
#  words in 
annual 
report
#  words in 
annual 
report
Outcome 
of ethical 
dilemma
Ethical 23 28 1 2 14 61 
particular 6 10 0 1 19 98 
Educational- 0 0 0 0 0 5 
wisdom 0 4 0 1 0 101 
emotional 0 0 0 0 0 0 
justice 0 6 0 0 1 505 
point sum 29 48 1 4 34 770 0 
Deontological Ethics
# words in 
text
# similar 
words in 
ethical 
guidelines
# words in 
company 
values
#similar 
words in 
company 
values
#  words in 
annual 
report
# similar 
words in 
annual 
report
Outcome 
of ethical 
dilemma
Universal 0 5 0 3 0 231 
Rationality 0 10 0 2 0 4 
humanity- 0 4 0 1 0 27 
autonomy 0 3 0 1 0 213 
duty 4 10 0 0 1 239 
imperfect- 0 2 0 5 0 61 
point sum 4 34 0 12 1 775 0 
Care Ethics
# words in 
texts
# similar 
words in 
ethical 
guidelines
# words in 
company 
values
#similar 
words in 
company 
values
#  words in 
annual 
report
# similar 
words in 
annual 
report
Outcome 
of ethical 
dilemma
Care 5 2 0 3 3 136 
relational 19 4 0 1 0 89 
personal 8 70 0 1 3 100 
Under- 
standing 1 5 1 2 97 9 
choice 0 4 0 1 1 170 
feminist 0 8 0 2 0 78 
point sum 33 93 1 10 104 582 0 
Pragmatism
# words in 
texts
# similar 
words in 
ethical 
guidelines
# words in 
company 
values
#similar 
words in 
company 
values
#  words in 
annual 
report
# similar 
words in 
annual 
report
Outcome 
of ethical 
dilemma
Progress 0 0 0 4 21 572 
practical 0 11 0 1 3 93 
social 2 30 1 4 22 271 
non- 
foundationalist 0 0 0 0 0 
non-dualist 0 0 0 0 0 
scientific 
method 0 1 0 2 20 7 
point sum 2 42 1 11 66 943 0 
Telenor
Utilitarianism
# words in 
texts
# similar 
words in 
ethical 
guidelines
# words in 
company 
values
#similar 
words in 
company 
values
#  words in 
annual 
report
# similar 
words in 
annual 
report
Outcome 
of ethical 
dilemma
Utility 0 15 0 1 0 242 
happiness 0 0 0 1 0 7 
revisionist 0 0 0 0 0 217 
secular 0 20 0 1 0 27 
real 0 10 0 0 24 37 
mathematical 0 0 0 0 0 51 
0 45 0 3 24 581 0 
Virtue Ethics
# words in 
texts
# similar 
words in 
ethical 
guidelines
# words in 
company 
values
#similar 
words in 
company 
values
#  words in 
annual 
report
# similar 
words in 
annual 
report
Outcome 
of ethical 
dilemma
Ethical 7 1 0 1 0 6 
particular 3 7 0 0 9 26 
Educational- 0 2 0 1 0 3 
wisdom 0 3 0 0 0 34 
emotional 0 1 0 1 0 409 
justice 0 5 0 1 1 0 
10 19 0 4 10 478 0 
Deontological Ethics
# words in 
text
# similar 
words in 
ethical 
guidelines
# words in 
company 
values
#similar 
words in 
company 
values
#  words in 
annual 
report
# similar 
words in 
annual 
report
Outcome 
of ethical 
dilemma
Universal 0 15 0 1 3 68 
Rationality 0 8 0 0 0 19 
humanity- 0 8 0 1 0 14 
autonomy 0 6 0 0 0 46 
duty 4 3 0 1 0 129 
imperfect- 0 3 0 0 0 15 
4 43 0 3 3 291 0 
Care Ethics
# words in 
texts
# similar 
words in 
ethical 
guidelines
# words in 
company 
values
#similar 
words in 
company 
values
#  words in 
annual 
report
# similar 
words in 
annual 
report
Outcome 
of ethical 
dilemma
Care 5 2 0 1 4 37 
relational 0 1 0 1 0 17 
personal 11 4 0 1 0 22 
Under- 
standing 4 2 0 0 1 1 
choice 0 0 0 0 0 159 
feminist 0 2 0 1 0 18 
20 11 0 4 5 254 0 
Pragmatism
# words in 
texts
# similar 
words in 
ethical 
guidelines
# words in 
company 
values
#similar 
words in 
company 
values
#  words in 
annual 
report
# similar 
words in 
annual 
report
Outcome 
of ethical 
dilemma
Progress 0 2 0 1 6 125 
practical 0 2 0 1 1 49 
social 1 3 0 1 21 30 
non- 
foundationalist 0 0 0 0 0 40 
non-dualist 0 0 0 0 0 0 
scientific 
method 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2 7 0 3 28 244 0 
Hydro
Utilitarianism
# words in 
texts
# similar 
words in 
ethical 
guidelines
# words in 
company 
values
#similar 
words in 
company 
values
#  words in 
annual 
report
# similar 
words in 
annual 
report
Outcome 
of ethical 
dilemma
Utility 0 5 0 6 0 256 
happiness 0 0 0 1 0 40 
revisionist 0 0 0 1 3 177 
secular 0 15 0 1 0 90 
real 0 7 0 0 0 132 
mathematical 0 0 0 1 0 95 
0 27 0 10 3 790 0 
Virtue Ethics
# words in 
texts
# similar 
words in 
ethical 
guidelines
# words in 
company 
values
#similar 
words in 
company 
values
#  words in 
annual 
report
# similar 
words in 
annual 
report
Outcome 
of ethical 
dilemma
Ethical 1 1 0 2 5 25 
particular 4 0 0 0 44 106 
Educational- 0 3 0 2 3 19 
wisdom 0 5 1 1 0 52 
emotional 0 1 0 0 0 1 
justice 0 3 0 0 0 330 
5 13 1 5 52 533 0 
Deontological Ethics
# words in 
text
# similar 
words in 
ethical 
guidelines
# words in 
company 
values
#similar 
words in 
company 
values
#  words in 
annual 
report
# similar 
words in 
annual 
report
Outcome 
of ethical 
dilemma
Universal 0 7 0 0 2 293 
Rationality 0 2 0 0 0 18 
humanity- 0 3 0 2 0 73 
autonomy 0 6 0 1 0 41 
duty 0 5 0 2 5 105 
imperfect- 0 0 0 2 0 47 
0 23 0 7 7 577 0 
Care Ethics
# words in 
texts
# similar 
words in 
ethical 
guidelines
# words in 
company 
values
#similar 
words in 
company 
values
#  words in 
annual 
report
# similar 
words in 
annual 
report
Outcome 
of ethical 
dilemma
Care 5 8 1 2 2 49 
relational 0 2 0 0 0 9 
personal 7 16 1 2 1 57 
Under- 
standing 0 1 2 1 10 4 
choice 0 0 0 0 7 40 
feminist 0 6 0 1 0 22 
12 33 4 6 20 181 0 
Pragmatism
# words in 
texts
# similar 
words in 
ethical 
guidelines
# words in 
company 
values
#similar 
words in 
company 
values
#  words in 
annual 
report
# similar 
words in 
annual 
report
Outcome 
of ethical 
dilemma
Progress 0 0 0 2 13 243 
practical 0 4 0 0 0 100 
social 1 3 0 2 38 140 
non- 
foundationalist 0 0 0 0 0 0 
non-dualist 0 0 0 0 0 0 
scientific 
method 0 1 0 0 13 3 
1 8 4 4 64 486 0 
Sykepleieforbund
Utilitarianism
# words in 
texts
# similar 
words in 
ethical 
guidelines
# words in 
company 
values
#similar 
words in 
company 
values
#  words in 
annual 
report
# similar 
words in 
annual 
report
Outcome 
of ethical 
dilemma
Utility 0 4 0 21 0 1 
happiness 0 0 0 4 0 0 
revisionist 1 3 0 19 1 2 
secular 0 2 0 31 0 10 
real 0 3 4 28 0 20 
mathematical 0 3 0 69 0 71 
1 15 4 172 1 104 0 
Virtue Ethics
# words in 
texts
# similar 
words in 
ethical 
guidelines
# words in 
company 
values
#similar 
words in 
company 
values
#  words in 
annual 
report
# similar 
words in 
annual 
report
Outcome 
of ethical 
dilemma
Ethical 23 14 22 24 5 20 
particular 3 6 3 30 1 6 
Educational- 0 0 31 1 12 4 
wisdom 0 3 0 29 0 23 
emotional 0 0 0 1 0 0 
justice 0 4 0 1 0 0 
26 27 56 86 18 53 0 
Deontological Ethics
# words in 
text
# similar 
words in 
ethical 
guidelines
# words in 
company 
values
#similar 
words in 
company 
values
#  words in 
annual 
report
# similar 
words in 
annual 
report
Outcome 
of ethical 
dilemma
Universal 0 1 0 22 0 2 
Rationality 0 3 0 17 0 9 
humanity- 1 7 0 3 0 24 
autonomy 0 2 0 54 0 14 
duty 1 11 0 84 0 67 
imperfect- 0 0 0 5 0 0 
2 24 0 185 0 116 0 
Care Ethics
# words in 
texts
# similar 
words in 
ethical 
guidelines
# words in 
company 
values
#similar 
words in 
company 
values
#  words in 
annual 
report
# similar 
words in 
annual 
report
Outcome 
of ethical 
dilemma
Care 16 7 13 19 0 26 
relational 0 2 6 4 0 52 
personal 1 5 9 28 6 15 
Under- 
standing 0 2 9 0 0 10 
choice 1 0 4 6 92 3 
feminist 0 0 0 18 0 7 
18 16 41 75 98 113 0 
Pragmatism
# words in 
texts
# similar 
words in 
ethical 
guidelines
# words in 
company 
values
#similar 
words in 
company 
values
#  words in 
annual 
report
# similar 
words in 
annual 
report
Outcome 
of ethical 
dilemma
Progress 0 0 0 25 0 35 
practical 0 2 2 77 0 73 
social 1 2 5 16 3 54 
non- 
foundationalist 0 0 0 0 0 0 
non-dualist 0 0 0 0 0 0 
scientific 
method 0 1 0 2 0 2 
1 5 7 120 3 164 0 
OsloKommune
Utilitarianism
# words in 
texts
# similar 
words in 
ethical 
guidelines
# words in 
company 
values
#similar 
words in 
company 
values
#  words in 
annual 
report
# similar 
words in 
annual 
report
Outcome 
of ethical 
dilemma
Utility 0 1 1 5 4 18 
happiness 0 0 0 1 1 54 
revisionist 1 1 0 1 0 9 
secular 0 1 0 8 0 83 
real 0 2 0 0 6 16 
mathematical 0 0 0 2 0 64 
1 5 1 17 11 244 0 
Virtue Ethics
# words in 
texts
# similar 
words in 
ethical 
guidelines
# words in 
company 
values
#similar 
words in 
company 
values
#  words in 
annual 
report
# similar 
words in 
annual 
report
Outcome 
of ethical 
dilemma
Ethical 0 1 26 2 0 0 
particular 0 1 0 2 33 20 
Educational- 0 1 0 0 67 53 
wisdom 0 1 0 2 0 91 
emotional 0 1 0 1 0 4 
justice 0 0 1 0 1 7 
0 5 27 7 101 175 0 
Deontological Ethics
# words in 
ext
# similar 
words in 
ethical 
guidelines
# words in 
company 
values
#similar 
words in 
company 
values
#  words in 
annual 
report
# similar 
words in 
annual 
report
Outcome 
of ethical 
dilemma
Universal 0 1 0 2 0 104 
Rationality 0 1 1 2 1 0 
humanity- 0 1 0 2 0 355 
autonomy 0 0 0 2 0 33 
duty 0 0 6 5 2 61 
imperfect- 0 1 0 0 0 16 
0 4 7 13 3 569 0 
Care Ethics
# words in 
texts
# similar 
words in 
ethical 
guidelines
# words in 
company 
values
#similar 
words in 
company 
values
#  words in 
annual 
report
# similar 
words in 
annual 
report
Outcome 
of ethical 
dilemma
Care 1 2 0 11 0 108 
relational 0 2 0 5 0 64 
personal 0 1 4 2 2 156 
Under- 
standing 0 3 0 4 3 19 
choice 0 0 5 0 5 16 
feminist 0 1 0 5 0 16 
1 9 9 27 10 379 0 
Pragmatism
# words in 
texts
# similar 
words in 
ethical 
guidelines
# words in 
company 
values
#similar 
words in 
company 
values
#  words in 
annual 
report
# similar 
words in 
annual 
report
Outcome 
of ethical 
dilemma
Progress 0 1 0 1 3 101 
practical 0 3 0 1 3 5 
social 0 0 0 1 62 33 
non- 
foundationalist 0 0 0 0 0 0 
non-dualist 0 0 0 0 0 0 
scientific 
method 0 0 0 0 3 2 
0 4 0 3 71 141 0 
Sum Statoil Telenor Hydro SykepleieforbundOsloKommune
Utilitarianism 1145 653 830 297 279 
Virtue Ethics 886 521 604 266 315 
Deontology 826 344 614 327 596 
Care Ethics 582 294 244 361 435 
Pragmatism 1065 284 566 300 219 
4504 
Telenor Statoil
Key Terms Statoil Telenor Hydro Sykepleie OK
Ut. 0 0 0 5 2 
Vir. 30 10 6 82 27 
Deon. 4 4 0 2 7 
Care 34 20 16 59 10 
Prag 2 2 5 8 0 
Annual Report-Key TermsStatoil Telenor Hydro Sykepleie OK
Ut. 49 24 3 1 11 
Vir. 34 10 52 18 101 
Deon. 1 3 7 0 3 
Care 104 5 20 98 10 
Prag. 66 28 64 3 71 
Synonyms graphStatoil Telenor Hydro Sykepleie OK
Ut. 88 48 37 189 22 
Vir. 52 23 18 113 12 
Deon. 46 46 30 209 17 
Care 103 15 39 91 36 
Prag. 53 10 12 125 7 
Annual Report - SynonymsStatoil Telenor Hydro Sykepleie OK
Ut. 1008 581 790 104 244 
Vir. 770 478 533 53 175 
Deon. 775 291 577 116 569 
Care 582 254 181 113 379 
Prag. 943 244 486 164 141 
